OMRI: PURSUING BALKAN PEACE, V1,#7, Feb. 20, 1996

From: OMRI-L <omri-l@ubvm.cc.buffalo.edu>

Open Media Research Institute: Pursuing Balkan Peace Directory

CONTENTS

OMRI SPECIAL REPORT: PURSUING BALKAN PEACE

Vol. 1, No. 7, 20 February 1996

[01] INTRODUCTION

This period witnessed developments in the two crises that together constituted what outgoing U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke called the "most serious threat" to face the Dayton process to date (see OMRI Special Report, 13 February 1996). The first centered on the arrested Serbian officers in Sarajevo and was linked to broader issues. These were the future of the Serbs in the reunited capital and republic, and the relative importance of bringing war criminals to justice versus ensuring freedom of movement. This dispute led to the Serbs' breaking off all contacts to NATO and to joint commissions on which they worked with the Muslims and Croats. Indicted war criminals Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic resurfaced in public, and seemed to taunt an international community and IFOR that were unable or unwilling to arrest them

The second imbroglio involved EU administrator Hans Koschnick's plan to reunite Mostar. It, too, had fundamental implications for the ultimate success or failure of the Dayton accord, since it touched on the future of the Croat-Muslim federation and on the principle of binding arbitration. The Croats' rejection of Koschnick's plan froze the process of reuniting Mostar, while a series of deadlines set down in the treaty to that effect passed unmet. Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic called Mostar "the pebble in Europe's shoe," Oslobodjenje reported on 17 February. The violence of the Croats' demonstrations underscored the seriousness of the rift that had emerged between the Croats and their former patrons in Bonn, and raised questions about Zagreb's willingness to abide by the Dayton accords. The Croats, for their part, felt that the Koschnick plan raised questions about the EU's impartiality

The outcome of these two stand-offs was first a shuttle mission to the region by Holbrooke, who is often described as the man most responsible for the Dayton accords. Then came the summit, which was held on 17 and 18 February. That gathering was organized on very short notice and brought together the foreign ministers of the Contact Group countries plus the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. The final documents managed to address all the various issues that had prompted the meeting in the first place, Nasa Borba said on the 19th. The safety of the Serbs in Sarajevo was guaranteed, while procedures were clarified for dealing with war criminals. The Serbs would end their boycott of military and civilian committions. All parties pledged to cooperate with the tribunal in The Hague. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for human rights John Shattuck said he was sure that Karadzic and Mladic would be "brought down" as a result, the International Herald Tribune reported . The Serbs agreed to return to the commissions, in return for which steps would be taken to lift economic sanctions against them

The Mostar crisis was dealt with through a Croat-Muslim declaration on the federation and related topics. The Croats got a concession in that the central district would be smaller than in Koschnick's plan, while the Muslims won a key point in that freedom of movement throughout the city would be guaranteed even for military-aged males. A joint police force would come into being quickly. In other documents, Zagreb and Belgrade promised to step up efforts aimed at normalizing bilateral relations, while Serbian Persident Slobodan Milosevic and Izetbegovic agreed to meet as often as once each month and to set up a hotline

What would actually come of all this remained to be seen. Holbrooke was optimistic, and many newspapers around the world ran headlines like: "Dayton Back on Track." There were, however, at least as many grounds for skepticism. Much of the "breakthrough" consisted of no more than getting the parties to agree to what they had already signed onto before -- and then done as they pleased. The question of cooperating with The Hague was perhaps only the most glaring example. Whether all this was the result of "misunderstandings" or of bad faith was somethimes open to dispute, but the fact remained that much of Holbrooke's work in Rome consisted of reinforcing what had supposedly already been nailed down. Holbrooke would soon retire from government and go back to Wall Street, and, in any event, neither he nor any other diplomat would be able to hold a summit every time some serious glitch arose in the Dayton process

The ultimate test of the success of the Rome summit would, of course, be implementation on the ground. Some observers noted that the military provisions of the Dayton treaty had been carried out much better than the civilian ones, and that the reasons for this were that the military passages were very precise and that IFOR had a clear mandate to enforce them in the face of transgressions. The passages relating to civilian affairs, by contrast, were often relatively fuzzy; and, in any event, it was not clear how they could or would be enforced when IFOR showed reluctance even to arrest indicted war criminals

And the immediate reactions by some prominent figures from the region also gave cause for concern. Upon returning to Zagreb, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman said that the meeting marked a defeat for "certain European circles" that had allegedly created musunderstandings to discredit the existing accords, AFP reported. This is presumably a reference to Koschnick and to some British, French, and Dutch officials of the EU, and does not suggest that any real atmosphere of trust emerged from the meetings. There were, moreover, mixed reactions from Bosnian Serb leaders, which indicated that the question of the Serbs' future in Sarajevo had not been solved in an unambiguous fashion or that not all the Serb leaders were marching to the same tune as called by Milosevic. The Bosnian Serb military, in fact, boycotted a meeting just one day after the Rome conference. -- Patrick Moore

[02] DIFFERING VOICES FROM THE BOSNIAN SERB LEADERSHIP.

[03] SERBIAN EXODUS FROM SARAJEVO UNDER WAY.

[04] MILOSEVIC SAYS THAT SERBS HAVE NO REASON TO LEAVE SARAJEVO.

[05] IFOR RELEASES SUSPECTED TERRORISTS.

[06] TERRORIST INCIDENT RAISES SOME QUESTIONS.

[07] IFOR GAINS ACCESS TO BOSNIAN SERB WEAPONS DEPOTS.

[08] FRENCH TROOPS FIND ARSENAL AMID ONIONS AND POTATOES.

[09] SARAJEVO BUS TARGETED FROM "KNOWN LOCATIONS."

[10] TROUBLE AHEAD IN BOSANSKI NOVI?

[11] TUZLA SEEKS TO RESETTLE REFUGEES.

[12] UNHCR OFFICIAL MEETS BOSNIAN SERB VICE PRESIDENT TO DISCUSS REFUGEE R

[13] ARE THE BOSNIAN SERBS PREPARING AN AMNESTY?

[14] EASTERN SLAVONIAN UPDATE.

[15] CROATIAN POLICE ARRIVE IN MOSTAR.

[16] MILOSEVIC OFF POLITICKING IN BOSNIA.

[17] SESELJ TO TESTIFY AGAINST MILOSEVIC?

[18] LEADERS IN THE DAYTON PROCESS NOMINATED FOR THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE.

[19] A VISIT TO THE BOSNIAN SERB NEWS AGENCY SRNA.

The two small rooms full of technical equipment are overcrowded. Of altogether 111 agency journalists, 59 work and sleep in Pension Bellevue, and most of them are refugees from Sarajevo. "This is an incredible, enthusiastic group," says llic. "We live and work together under very special circumstances. The government provides our food at the Hotel Panorama. These people are young, devoted, and ready to work and improvise 24 hours a day, to counteract the misinformation of the oppressor."

At the beginning," says llic, "we were just five to six people. We had to leave our entire infrastructure behind under Muslim control in Sarajevo and to start completely anew. But already on 7 April, three days after the beginning of the war, we founded SRNA." Now the agency has 25 correspondents throughout the Republika Srpska, six in Serbia proper, and 21 foreign correspondents from Athens to Sydney. "It is important to reach our emigrants." His voice heightens: "Immediately after the war started, the Muslims hired PR agencies and cooperated with all international networks to stage their media war. They got all kinds of money and know-how helping them to demonize Serbs. However, nobody supported us. All during the war we never had any cooperation with any international agency. Muslims and Croats simply provided the agencies with the information which they simply took. They never rechecked the sources, simply spreading that information around the world. We never did that." llic offers Japanese whisky, then continues: "Both sides were engaged in a media war. But thanks to the much better technical equipment and higher funds the other side had, we had no chance to compete. All we could put against it was our professional dignity and objective information. And we only defended our people from the Muslims and Croats attacks, not to leave shame on us. Otherwise our people would not have believed in us."

While doing this job SRNA has expanded rather well. The Pale authorities equipped their mouthpiece with its first computers, and whatever else was needed was provided by Serbian media colleagues and emigrant friends. Though "handicapped due to the blockade," the agency managed to reach the world by sending its messages via satellite to Belgrade, from where they were sent on. Meanwhile, notwithstanding all technical difficulties after the NATO bombing of the transmitters in September, SRNA managed to get its word out. "The bombing was a catastrophy," says Ilic. We had nothing left, all news had to be delivered via amateur radio operators in Belgrade. Nevertheless we managed to give out 40 to 50 news items daily, even though Muslim radio amateurs tried to interfere and were permanently insulting us over the radio. At first we were scared using radio at all because it would lead NATO right to us. But then it became clear that they knew exactly where we were. There were many foreign media crews here, so we dared."

"If there were no blockade", complains llic, "many more requests would reach us. We ourselves replace our lack of contacts with the world through monitoring, but the world receives much too little from us." SRNA monitors all receivable broadcasters via satellite, from CNN to RFE/RL's South Slavic Service. Does this feeling of an unfortunate lack of contact include the missing contacts to the agencies of the other entities? Would Serbia wish an exchange with Onasa, the independent news agency in Sarajevo? A long pause follows. Ilic quotes history, but is interrupted. Does the director of SRNA wish such an exchange? "Well", he finally answers. "it would be interesting on purely professional grounds, just to see how the oppressor puts things, and of course just for information. Not to make use any of it." Another pause, then, in a more conciliatory tone, llic says: "First both sides have to be taught to live next to one another. Then they have to learn to respect each other. Only later, very slowly, can we start doing things together. To rush us can lead to an incident which would make the whole process explode."

Anyway, being a state agency, no such thing could be agreed upon without the approval of Pale's minister of information. It does not seem that llic expects such approval. Half an hour later the interlocutors talk to Minister Dragan Bozanic. It takes him two seconds to approve. A first, a tentative media link may be established. Nonetheless, no fax lines between the two entities are working and the three daily outlets of both agencies will have to be delivered by hand, brought over probably with IFOR's daily shuttle between Sarajevo and Pale. Still, at least in Pale, the news will be read as "information only" and not be provided to the public. At any rate, it is a beginning. -- Yvonne Badal