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OMRI Pursuing Balkan Peace, No. 34, 96-08-27
From: Open Media Research Institute <http://www.omri.cz>
Pursuing Balkan Peace
No. 34, 27 August 1996
CONTENTS
[01] POSTPONING THE INEVITABLE?
[02] 8,000 CANDIDATES TO BE DROPPED FROM BOSNIAN BALLOTS?
[03] BILDT DENIES ELECTION DAY DEAL WITH BOSNIAN SERBS.
[04] CROATS, SERBS, MUSLIMS ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL.
[05] PRE-ELECTION VIOLENCE GETTING WORSE.
[06] OSCE PENALIZES BOSNIAN CROAT PARTY.
[07] IFOR UPDATE.
[08] "OPERATION VOLCANO" BRINGS VOCAL SERBIAN RESPONSE.
[09] WHAT WILL BE DONE WITH ALL THE BOSNIAN SERB MUNITIONS?
[10] IFOR STEPS UP CONTROL IN BRCKO REGION.
[11] NEW TRIBUNAL OFFICES IN SARAJEVO, BELGRADE.
[12] RUMP YUGOSLAV TRADE DELEGATION IN SARAJEVO.
[13] TURKISH MILITARY TIES TO THE REGION.
[14] ZAGREB AND BELGRADE: MUTUAL RECOGNITION LEAVES OPEN QUESTIONS.
[15] POSITIONS REMAIN RIGID IN KOSOVO DISPUTE.
[01] POSTPONING THE INEVITABLE?
The OSCE commission monitoring the 14 September elections in Bosnia-
Herzegovina announced today that the municipal part of the ballot will be
postponed to April or May of next year. This comes in response to evidence
that massive pressure and coercion have been used on Bosnian Serbs in the
Republika Srpska (RS) and especially in Serbia to register to vote in key
towns that had large Muslim populations before the war but are now mainly
Serb. While the postponement seems to extricate the OSCE from a series of
difficulties for the moment, it potentially opens up a Pandora's box of new
ones.
The UNHCR yesterday was but the latest body to point out that the Serbs are
using registration to consolidate the ethnic partition of the country,
Oslobodjenje wrote this morning. It appears that up to 100,000 Bosnian Serb
refugees have been "encouraged" to sign up to vote in towns like Srebrenica,
Brcko, or Bijeljina at the risk of losing their humanitarian aid rations or of
facing other unpleasant consequences. The governing Serbian Democratic Party
(SDS) did this in keeping with its aim of preventing Muslims or Croats from
reestablishing a foothold in areas from which they have been "ethnically
cleansed." It also wants to bring all Bosnian Serbs into the RS as a prelude
to realizing the party's frequently stated goal of a greater Serbia.
The Serbs have not been alone in resorting to such electoral engineering. The
Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA) has urged refugees from Srebrenica and
other eastern Bosnian towns to vote in the formerly Serb-held suburbs of
Sarajevo. Among the Croats, moreover, there is ample evidence that the
governing Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) has been encouraging its people
to resettle and register in areas that form a compact whole and border
Croatia.
What made the Serbs' actions stand out, however, was their magnitude and
systematic nature. The SDS was able to do this because of one of the many
contradictions inherent in the Dayton agreement. On the one hand, that
document guarantees the right of refugees to go home and the right to freedom
of movement in a multi-ethnic Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thanks to
these principles, refugees may fill out the so-called P-1 form that enables
them to vote in the place where they registered for the 1991 census, i.e. in
their home area before they were ethnically cleansed. On the other hand, the
treaty also allows people to register with the P-2 form, which permits them to
cast their ballot in the place where they currently live or for a place where
they intend to live in the future. It is this last point that the Serbs have
apparently abused the most by recruiting large numbers of refugees in Serbia
to claim that they intend to move to places like Srebrenica and hence ask to
be allowed to vote in that town's municipal election.
OSCE election supervisor Robert Frowick's decision today, however, may raise
more problems than it solves. The municipal vote may have been put off until
next spring, but six additional levels of elections are still slated for 14
September. Will these be at all affected by the registration imbroglio? Will
the OSCE be able to save most of the electoral process by sacrificing part of
it, or will the whole thing collapse? When the municipal ballot finally does
take place, how will voters be allowed to register? Will the international
community in the meantime finally get serious about enforcing freedom of
movement and other basic Dayton principles, or will it continue the inaction
and waffling that invite abuse in the this part of the world?
And how will the parties react to the OSCE's announcement? The postponement
probably means that the SDA will call off its threat to boycott the 14
September vote, but might not the SDS now launch its own boycott, since its
leaders have repeatedly said that all levels of the elections must take place
on time? This point was reaffirmed only yesterday by the acting SDS chief,
Aleksa Buha, Nasa Borba wrote this morning. One might also ask what the
entire affair says about the role in the Bosnian peace process of Serbia and
its president, Slobodan Milosevic, on whose territory much of the wholesale
coercion took place.
And all this still leaves the question of who will organize, supervise, and
provide security for the 1997 round. Most of the international presence in
Bosnia-Herzegovina specified by the Dayton agreement is slated to wind up at
the end of 1996, if not sooner. U.S. President Bill Clinton in particular
seems opposed to any continuation of IFOR after that date.
Will the international community "declare victory and withdraw" (to borrow the
phrase from the Vietnam War) after the September vote -- and allow the three
nationalist parties to run the 1997 elections? If so, why bother postponing
the inevitable at all? -- Patrick Moore
[02] 8,000 CANDIDATES TO BE DROPPED FROM BOSNIAN BALLOTS?
Regardless of when the vote takes place, there may be far fewer candidates
running than the parties had expected. A statement issued by the OSCE says
that the status of 8,000 out of the 28,000 declared candidates for the 14
September elections is in doubt because the individuals' names do not appear
on the election rolls. Those rosters are based on the 1991 census, and hence
it would appear that the 8,000 may have subsequently come to Bosnia from
elsewhere. Two of the candidates are ineligible because they are indicted war
criminals, AFP noted on 25 August. They are Dusko Sikirica (32) and Gojko
Jankovic (41), who wanted to run in the municipal elections on the slate of
the extremist Party of Serbian Unity. The OSCE has also ruled that 1,470 out
of 5,010 of the SDA's candidates are ineligible because their names do not
appear on the 1991 census rolls, Onasa noted on 26 August. Some 100 candidates
of the opposition's Joint List, too, are out of the running, including two of
its leaders, Zlatko Lagumdzija and Bogic Bogicevic. Lagumdzija responded in a
letter that challenged the accuracy of the Provisional Election Commission's
data. He noted that, according to their figures, he must be 340 years old,
Oslobodjenje on 27 August quoted him as saying. -- Patrick Moore
[03] BILDT DENIES ELECTION DAY DEAL WITH BOSNIAN SERBS.
Still on the elections, the international community's High Representative Carl
Bildt wrote to the acting president of the Republika Srpska, Biljana Plavsic,
denying reports from Pale about an alleged agreement between his office and
the Serbs, Nasa Borba reported on 27 August. According to the reports, Bildt
had agreed to Serb demands that would limit cross-border freedom of movement
on election day in violation of the Dayton agreement. The deal allegedly
specified that voters could cross the border but only at 20 agreed locations
and only in buses. Elsewhere, former prime minister and Party for Bosnia and
Herzegovina (SBiH) leader Haris Silajdzic told the BBC that the confusion
surrounding the vote is a legacy of the communist past, which will only go
away with time. -- Patrick Moore
[04] CROATS, SERBS, MUSLIMS ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL.
Back on the stump, the HDZ officially launched its campaign on 25 August in
Sarajevo, AFP reported. The party is the leading Croatian party in Bosnia-
Herzegovina as well as in Croatia. Bosnian federal President Kresimir Zubak
told 1,000 supporters at the sports center that "we have two homelands --
Bosnia and Croatia -- and we love and cherish them equally." He noted that
Bosnia must be the home of Croats, Serbs, and Muslims alike. Meanwhile in
Banja Luka, Bosnian Serb acting President Biljana Plavsic sounded a rather
different note at an SDS rally, arguing for "a single Serb state" and ruled
out any union with other nationalities. She slammed the idea of "unification
with the Muslims and Croats," claiming that Bosnian Serbs "want the
unification of all the Serbs of the Balkans in a single state called Serbia."
Plavsic added that "there is an alternative to peace . . . The Serb nation and
its state are more sacred than any peace." And in Croat-held Capljina, a local
imam told a rally of the SDA on 24 August that "the Koran is our constitution.
Jihad is our path, our salvation." -- Patrick Moore
[05] PRE-ELECTION VIOLENCE GETTING WORSE.
Nor does it appear that the imam is alone in believing that political goals
should be pursued by non-political means. The UN spokesman in Sarajevo,
Alexander Ivanko, said on 22 August that opposition parties' leaders and
supporters are being increasingly intimidated by the ruling parties in the
northern towns of Cazin and Teslic, Onasa reported. Along with eight
explosions in the Bihac region during the previous week, three explosions were
reported in Cazin on 22 August, all of them believed to be politically related
and directed at supporters of opposition parties. The UN also received a
letter from a local opposition party accusing the SDA of acts of intimidation
in Cazin. Meanwhile in the Republika Srpska, a police unit controlled by the
SDS took into custody a factory director in Teslic who headed the local
opposition party. Ivanko said special Serbian forces continue to operate
around the town, with city officials refusing to explain their presence. --
Daria Sito Sucic
[06] OSCE PENALIZES BOSNIAN CROAT PARTY.
And the Croats, too, have come in for criticism. The OSCE said on 21 August
that the HDZ has "seriously violated" the voter-registration procedure,
Oslobodjenje reported the next day. The OSCE's Mostar office said that an
HDZ official had illegally taken forms filled in by voters in Jasenica, south
of Mostar, possibly intending to tamper with them. An OSCE appeals board had
ordered the removal from office of the local electoral commission president,
Vlado Bevanda, who had denied HDZ involvement in the matter despite evidence
to the contrary. It also ordered the removal of Bevanda's name from the HDZ
election list and the immediate termination of his candidacy for public
office. The OSCE also fined the HDZ $10,000. That same day, officials from the
two ruling parties in the Bosnian federation agreed that obstacles to the
revival of that federation have been removed, Onasa reported. The SDA and the
HDZ agreed to a more rapid institution of cantonal authorities and
transitional municipal councils, but they failed to agree on a federal finance
system and the status of the controversial state intelligence body known as
the Agency for Research and Documentation. -- Daria Sito Sucic
[07] IFOR UPDATE.
NATO has been in the news, too. It announced on 24 August that it is banning
until further notice all Bosnian army helicopter flights and the movement of
Bosnian army troops into the sensitive Bihac pocket. On 22 August the army
tried to move a convoy of newly-trained troops from Zenica into that area,
where Muslim fought Muslim during the conflict. The following day the
government army in four places tried to transport troops by helicopter in
defiance of NATO rules, Reuters reported. IFOR also identified a series of
potential troubles spots for election day and said it will beef up security
there. The 12 towns are: Velika Kladusa, Brcko (see below), Doboj, Srebrenica,
Prijedor, Fojnica, Jajce, Vitez, Busovaca, Kiseljak, Novi Travnik, and Stolac,
Oslobodjenje reported on 25 August. Meanwhile, ground troops commander Lt.
Gen. Sir Michael Walker told Dnevni avaz on 24 August that IFOR faces a
potential danger from terrorists. He noted that a "weapons training center"
exists near Fojnica on government-held territory and that Sarajevo is aware of
it. To date, however, all of IFOR's 35 fatalities have been victims of
accidents and not of attacks by any of the three local armies, he pointed out.
-- Patrick Moore
[08] "OPERATION VOLCANO" BRINGS VOCAL SERBIAN RESPONSE.
But NATO's best-known activities this past week centered on its destruction of
previously unreported Bosnian Serb arms. IFOR continued Operation Volcano,
which dealt with the weapons cache found in Margetici two weeks earlier (see
). According to Onasa reports, IFOR that day destroyed 36 tons of anti-tank
and anti-personnel mines and other munitions in pits 27 meters wide and 7
meters deep. This was accompanied by Bosnian Serb protests against the IFOR
operation. Plavsic, complaining that the arms are being destroyed at the same
time as the Muslims and Croats in the Bosnian federation are being armed,
proposed that IFOR instead sell the weapons or transfer the depot, AFP
reported. As part of an aggressive media campaign, the Pale-based news agency
SRNA alleged that the detonations have caused cracks in the walls of "the
region's oldest church." Bosnian Serb officials' litany of complaints against
Operation Volcano also includes allegations that the operation is jeopardizing
underground water supplies and that IFOR has been dumping radioactive waste
materials. Responding to the allegations, IFOR spokesman Maj. Max Marriner has
said water sources are in no danger and IFOR is "not in the business of
dumping radioactive waste," Onasa reported. In any event, Operation Volcano
ended on 24 August. -- Stan Markotich and Daria Sito Sucic
[09] WHAT WILL BE DONE WITH ALL THE BOSNIAN SERB MUNITIONS?
Questions have nonetheless arisen over what to do about an additional 16 sites
declared by the Bosnian Serbs. Reportedly ten of those cites contain some 2,
600 tons of munitions similar to those discovered at Margetici. Suggesting
that the additional munitions deposits may not be destroyed, Maj. Brett
Boudreau has said that "all options are under consideration," Reuters reported
on 21 August. Some speculation already centers on the possibility that IFOR
may allow the Bosnian Serbs "to move the contraband to an already approved
storage site," Reuters added. -- Stan Markotich
[10] IFOR STEPS UP CONTROL IN BRCKO REGION.
Still in the Republika Srpska, IFOR troops have increased their control over
goods and passengers and set up new checkpoints around the northern Bosnian
town of Brcko, Onasa reported on 19 August. Brcko is becoming an increasingly
important issue for both the Bosnian Serbs and the Muslim-Croat federation.
While Bosnian Serb leaders have said that "Brcko is more important for Serbs
than peace," Bosnian federation officials and parties also underscore its
significance for their side. The status of Brcko is to be decided by 14
December through arbitration, as specified in the Dayton agreement. The Brcko
corridor is the only traffic artery connecting Bosnian Serbs in western parts
of the country with those in eastern areas and with Serbia. Bosnian federation
Vice President Ejup Ganic stressed that 56 percent of Brcko's prewar
population was Muslim and that those forcibly expelled by Serbs should return
to their homes. Ganic said the subject of arbitration is the whole area,
including the town itself, and not just the contentious line of separation
around the town, as Serbs claim. -- Daria Sito Sucic
[11] NEW TRIBUNAL OFFICES IN SARAJEVO, BELGRADE.
Graham Blewitt, prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, opened an office in Sarajevo on 22 August and announced
that another would be opened the next day in Belgrade, Onasa reported. Blewitt
said the tribunal's Sarajevo bureau will assist the international team
arriving in Bosnia in early September to resume mass-grave investigations. He
said the Belgrade office represents a major step forward, since the
prosecutor's office has been trying to establish a base in that city since
1994. The Belgrade bureau will allow the war-crimes tribunal to investigate
and gather evidence of atrocities committed against Serbs by talking to
victims and witnesses now living in rump Yugoslavia (SRJ) or in the RS.
Meanwhile, NATO officials on 22 August rejected as "wrong and groundless"
accusations by Judge Richard Goldstone of the Hague-based tribunal that IFOR
does not want to arrest Bosnian Serb leaders and indicted war criminals
Radovan Karadzic and Gen. Ratko Mladic, Onasa reported. -- Daria Sito
Sucic
[12] RUMP YUGOSLAV TRADE DELEGATION IN SARAJEVO.
The Belgrade connection has been in the news from Bosnia for other reasons,
too. SRJ Deputy Premier Nikola Sainovic headed a trade delegation that met
with Bosnian government officials on 26 August, Oslobodjenje reported. The
mission was the first of its kind since the Bosnian war broke out in 1992.
Returning a visit by a Bosnian trade group to the SRJ on 23 July, the
delegates met with Bosnian Premier Hasan Muratovic and President Alija
Izetbegovic, among others. Tanjug quoted Sainovic as saying that a consensus
on several economic issues had been reached and that the rump Yugoslav
national airline, JAT, may begin services to Sarajevo by next week. Muratovic
commented that it had been agreed that experts would meet "to define a [joint]
payments system and to define border crossings and procedures," Reuters
reported. AFP observed, however, that no progress was made toward reaching an
agreement on establishing diplomatic relations. -- Stan Markotich
[13] TURKISH MILITARY TIES TO THE REGION.
Turkey, for its part, has been evident as a player in the former Yugoslavia
this week. Ankara plans to sell three Spanish-designed CASA CN-235 light
transport aircraft to Croatia, the Turkish Daily News reported on 24 August.
The deal to sell the planes produced by Turkish Aerospace Industries must now
be ratified by Turkey's Defense Industry Executive, which will likely be a pro-
forma exercise. The sale was announced after Turkish and Croatian officials
met in Zagreb and concluded a military training agreement last week. Under the
deal, Croatian cadets and officers will be trained at Turkish military
academies and bases. During Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's state visit to
Turkey in June, a framework agreement to do precisely this was signed.
Meanwhile on 26 August, 223 Bosnian government troops began training with
Turkish tank and artillery units near Ankara , AFP reported, quoting the
Anatolia news agency. A previous group of 220 Bosnian soldiers had started a
three-month course there in May. -- Lowell Bezanis and Patrick Moore
[14] ZAGREB AND BELGRADE: MUTUAL RECOGNITION LEAVES OPEN QUESTIONS.
But one of the week's biggest stories involved Croatia and the SKJ. Croatian
Foreign Minister Mate Granic met with his rump Yugoslav counterpart Milan
Milutinovic in Belgrade on 23 August and signed an agreement on normalizing
bilateral relations. The two countries will establish "full diplomatic and
consular relations... within fifteen days of the signing," including the
exchange of ambassadors. But the deal itself leaves many questions unanswered.
The document's full text has so far been released only by Zagreb, while
Belgrade publicized only what it regards as the agreement's main points. The
two versions -- as presented by local and international media -- differ on the
two key issues: recognition of borders and the legal succession to
Tito's Yugoslavia. This indicates that what both sides greeted as a
"historic agreement" still must prove its viability.
Succession is particularly important to Belgrade, which wants the former
Yugoslavia's assets abroad and its seats in international organizations, as
well as its political legitimacy. The agreement, according to Tanjug, observed
that Zagreb had "accepted the state continuity of the SRJ and the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," noting that the outstanding issue
of overall succession will be resolved by consensus. But the text as
publicized by the Croatian government states that "taking into account the
fact that Serbia and Montenegro existed as separate states before the creation
of [the former] Yugoslavia... the Republic of Croatia recognizes the state
continuity of the SRJ." This version thus makes no reference to the SRJ as the
successor to Tito's state.
On the other main issue, Zagreb insisted that Belgrade recognize its
internationally accepted frontiers prior to normalization. While Zagreb
claimed that the SRJ has agreed to do so "within the framework of the
respective internationally-recognized borders," Belgrade observed that
outstanding territorial questions -- such as the Prevlaka peninsula -- are to
be handled within "the framework of negotiations and in the spirit of the UN
Charter and good-neighborly relations." Obviously there is agreement only in
principle, and concrete border questions are still subject to talks. (Prevlaka
belongs to Croatia but controls access to the SRJ's only naval base. Tudjman
is believed to be willing to swap it for Bosnian Serb territory behind
Dubrovnik but has been blocked by Croatian public opinion.)
Three commissions are to be formed in early September to deal with questions
relating to borders, assets of the former Yugoslavia, and refugee issues. The
need especially for the border commission shows that main issues remain
unresolved and may pose big problems in the near future.
The differing interpretations and the fact that Belgrade failed to publicize
the complete text suggests at least that the SRJ has reservations about the
meaning of the accord. At worst it may indicate that the government feels that
the terms of the deal are too contentious for full presentation to the Serbian
and Montenegrin publics.
In fact, reaction in Belgrade did include outright condemnation and disgust.
The ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS) dubbed the deal "the biggest
treason and capitulation that could ever happened to our country and our
people." Democratic Party (DS) leader Zoran Djindjic blasted it, saying it
represented nothing but Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's "personal
policy at the expense of [our] entire nation." In Podgorica, the leader of
the opposition People's Party of Montenegro (NSCG), Novak Kilibarda, said
that Belgrade walked away from the deal "the big loser" and added that
its hesitation to publish the full text "says a lot about the content of
the accord."
But it was Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic who emerged to underscore
just how big a spin Belgrade may be placing on the meaning and text of the
accord. In a 25 August interview with TV Montenegro, Bulatovic hailed the pact
and stressed it was a breakthrough specifically because Croatia agreed for
the first time to define the strategic Prevlaka peninsula as "a disputed
issue." He added that this development signaled "we are coming to the stage
where we can argue, using historical and other factors, that Prevlaka belongs
to its hinterland." He added that for now Prevlaka belongs "to neither"
Montenegro nor Croatia, as it remains monitored by UN observers. Bulatovic's
interpretation in fact appears to fit a broader pattern: on 27 August Nasa
Borba suggested TV Montenegro news reports on the deal have "falsified"
accounts of the agreement, claiming its text paved the way for Belgrade's
territorial claims against Prevlaka.
In Zagreb, reactions were comparatively muted. The official press approvingly
quoted Granic's statements calling the treaty "a breakthrough," etc.. The
opposition Croatian Peasant Party (HSS), however, noted that "this process is
fraught with unnecessary haste. We do not think the agreement should set no
conditions for [Belgrade]." Croatian nationalists also focused on the speed
with which an agreement was reached, suggesting the accord gives little or no
time for wounds to heal. Columnist Srecko Jurdana thus wrote that "the
normalization comprises a handshake over Croatian graves and the destruction
of Croatian culture." -- Stan Markotich and Stefan Krause
[15] POSITIONS REMAIN RIGID IN KOSOVO DISPUTE.
Moving on to Kosovo -- which many observers fear could be the site of the next
violent Balkan conflict -- Nasa Borba on 26 and 27 August published a series
of interviews with prominent ethnic Albanian and Serbian politicians. The
series is taken out of a book that appears under the title Kosmet or Kosovo:
A Serbian Jerusalem or an Albanian Piedmont?, and which focuses on possible
conditions under which a dialogue may start. The interviews are, however,
hardly optimistic. The deputy leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK),
Fehmi Agani, repeated the Albanian position that any solution should include
an independent state of Kosovo open to both Serbia and Albania. He ruled out
the idea of only restoring autonomy to the region, saying that such an idea
was ill-conceived. The Serbian side, however, repeated its charges that the
shadow-state government had secessionist aims. The governing Socialist Party
of Serbia's (SPS) leadership member and legislator Zivorad Igric charged the
Albanians of striving for a Republic of Kosovo with the aim of "eliminating
Serbia in the heart of Europe." Concerning a possible compromise, he said that
the SPS "did everything to disabuse the Albanian national minority of the
illusion in which the Albanian separatists pushed it," thereby putting the
blame for a continuing lack of dialogue on the Albanians. The former head of
the Kosovo League of Communists (SKJ) Mahmut Bakalli pointed out, however,
that a plan for a "greater Albania," as alleged by Serbian politicians, does
not exist among the mainstream Kosovar Albanians. While Bakalli would not rule
out the possibility of a division of Kosovo, both the LDK and Borislav Jovic,
an SPS legislator and former head of the federal Yugoslav Presidency, rejected
the idea. -- Fabian Schmidt
Compiled by Patrick Moore
This material was reprinted with permission of the Open Media
Research Institute, a nonprofit organization with research offices in
Prague, Czech Republic.
For more information on OMRI publications please write to info@omri.cz.
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