Part 2: UNFICYP, Its Effectiveness and Limits

Part 2: UNFICYP, Its Effectiveness and Limits

In March of 1964, following a sharp increase in intercommunal violence on Cyprus,¹⁸ the U.N. Security Council authorized the establishment of a U.N. peacekeeping mission mandated to:

"to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."¹⁹ In practical and current terms, this means that UNFICYP's chief responsibility on Cyprus is to supervise the cease-fire and thus foster conditions conducive to negotiating a peace settlement.²⁰ The principal way UNFICYP maintains the cease-fire is by preserving the military status quo within and along the buffer zone. A successfully maintained the status quo cuts off a prime source of spiraling tension. On a daily basis, UNFICYP endeavors to prevent military construction and improvements in positions in and along the buffer zone, to stop soldiers or unauthorized civilians from entering the buffer zone, to stop the sides from antagonizing each other across the buffer zone, and to investigate whatever incidents occur in and along the buffer zone. By seeking to minimize disputes and conflict along the buffer zone, UNFICYP seeks not only to maintain a cease-fire in the technical sense of no bullets flying, but also to keep tensions low and defuse threats to the cease-fire at the lowest possible level.

To maintain surveillance of the buffer zone, the U.N. staffs 22 permanent observations posts (OPs) along the buffer zone and uses another 120 OPs less frequently. Routine patrols within the buffer zone are conducted from 19 patrol bases. Patrols are also sent out to investigate whenever one of the sides complains about the other's construction, overmanning, or harassment - all frequent occurrences. The buffer zone is 180 kilometers long, comprises 3% of Cyprus' area, varies in width from 5 meters (in Nicosia) to seven kilometers, and contains some of Cyprus' most fertile agricultural land.²¹ The buffer zone separates the two sides and is the area that existed between the two opposing cease-fire lines at the end of the Turkish invasion in 1974. Map 2 shows how Cyprus looks from UNFICYP's perspective (similar maps are attached in each bi-yearly Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus).

Map 2, Cyprus from UNFICYP's Perspective ²²

UNFICYP confronts about 1000 recorded incidents a year, or about three per day. In addition, many more incidents don't make it into UNFICYP's record books.²³ What kinds of routine incidents does UNFICYP deal with?

Military construction along or into the buffer zone (the two sides are only supposed to maintain but not improve their positions).²⁴
Overmanning of positions along the buffer zone (many positions are only supposed to be manned by one or two soldiers).
Moves forward and encroachments into the buffer zone by the two sides.
Slingshotting and stone throwing between the two sides.
Insults and obscene gestures traded between the two sides.
The pointing and/or cocking of weapons between the two sides
Harassment of the other side with spotlights.

In response to these sorts of incidents, UNFICYP:

interposes itself between arguments, stone throwing, and so forth on the line.
investigates incidents to find out what really happened.
tells both sides to back down.
mediates or acts as a liaison between the two sides.
calls up the superior officers of misbehaving soldiers and gets them disciplined.
issues written protests to the offending side(s).

These routine incidents usually do not pose a high risk of escalation, in part because UNFICYP does a very good job of stopping or putting a damper on them. However, the possibility of escalation is always present and these sorts of incidents both reflect and cause simmering tension between the two sides.

Shootings and demonstrations are two types of incidents which can become considerably more violent and which can pose higher risks of escalation. I will discuss these in turn.

¹⁸ This violence was sparked when the President of Cyprus made a number of proposals to amend the 1960 constitution. These proposals would have ended several years of bickering and gridlock between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but they would have done so by eliminating many of the constitutional protections for the Turkish Cypriot minority and concentrating power in the Greek Cypriot majority.

¹⁹ Karl Th. Birgisson, "United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus," in William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 222.

²⁰ The question of whether or not UNFICYP deprives Cyprus of the 'hurting stalemate' that might be propitious for negotiations is a subject of debate. My bottom line is that the chance of war would go up significantly without UNFICYP. Thus, I don't advocate removing UNFICYP to promote peace because that is tantamount to promoting war to promote peace.

The mandate also covers humanitarian activities, including the bicommunal efforts described in the next section.

²¹ United Nations, S/1996/411, pp. 1-3, United Nations, Blue Helmets, 2 ed., pp. 306-307.

²² Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus, S/1995/1020, December 10, 1995, p. 23.

Editor's note: The image is a bit blurry. One can get such a map with any of UNFICYP's bi-annual reports. ²³ According to the Report of the Secretariat Review Team on the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, S/21982, December 7, 1990, paragraph 13, UNFICYP recorded 820 incidents in the first 10 months of 1990, 25% of the incidents were shootings, another 20% were encroachments into the buffer zone, and another 20% were strengthening of positions near the cease-fire line. Based on my research, I believe these statistics under-report antagonism and harassment incidents (because UNFICYP soldiers on the line can often defuse them quickly and informally and thus often don't bother to report them).

²⁴ The 1995 Roccas Bastion construction was perhaps the most notorious construction incident. The incident highlights UNFICYP's limits and effectiveness. Only the U.N. was capable of getting access to the Roccas Bastion on the Turkish side and conducting inspections to assure the Greek Cypriots that the construction was of little military utility. On the other hand, the U.N. had to expend almost every resource it had to obtain those inspections: involvement of the Secretary-General and of the U.N. Security Council, as well as coordination with various embassies.