Introduction

Introduction

This paper assesses what the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) can and cannot be expected to do to help promote a solution to the Cyprus problem and secure peace in the days that would follow². This paper has three sections. First, I analyze the overall strategic situation on Cyprus. Second, I assess the effectiveness and limits of UNFICYP's peacekeeping activities. Third, I discuss UNFICYP's role in promoting bicommunal activities and the problem of ethno-nationalism more generally.

In the first section, I argue that Turkey will be the dominant power in the region for the foreseeable future and that there is little UNFICYP or any other organization or state can do to help Cyprus in case of war involving Turkey. This has obvious implications for a solution to the Cyprus problem: both sides had better get along after a solution or disaster and tragedy will result. The tape from 1960 to 1974 could well get re-played.

In the second section, I argue that without UNFICYP the chance of war on Cyprus would increase significantly. While UNFICYP has trouble coping with some of the larger incidents it confronts, UNFICYP is generally effective and helps buy time for the two sides to reach a solution. That said, the types of incidents that UNFICYP confronts -- lethal shootings and violent demonstrations in particular -- offer a modest sign that the two sides may be unprepared to get along after a solution. However, UNFICYP in some form could help implement whatever solution may be reached by verifying demilitarization, monitoring elections, and so forth.

In the third section, I argue that bicommunal activities and other goodwill measures can help prepare the ground for a solution and can help maintain the peace after a solution is negotiated. UNFICYP plays a key role in sponsoring and helping coordinate bicommunal activities in part because it controls the buffer zone each side must cross to meet with the other and in part because it is one of the principal intermediaries between the parties

Unfortunately, despite increasing attendance at bicommunal activities, the problem that bicommunal activities address is getting worse, not better. The problem is ethno-nationalism. Rising ethno-nationalism, in a land already filled with propaganda and biased interpretations of history in everything from schools, the press, and politics, is a very bad sign about the prospects of the two sides being able to live together after an agreement.

The main argument of this paper is that a federal solution to the Cyprus problem is premature and would court a disaster similar to that of 1960-1974. Any solution that forces the two sides to live and govern together when they do not appear ready to get along is dangerous.

² While it is not my purpose to go into detail on the specifics of a possible Cyprus solution, the basic elements of a solution have been pushed by the U.N. and the West for years: a bizonal, bicommunal federation. Under such a solution, Cyprus would be demilitarized, the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities would govern their respective zones, and sovereignty and some powers would rest with the central, federal government (including perhaps foreign affairs, a central bank, and the post office). Just how much power would be accorded to the federal government and how much freedom of movement and property/ownership would be allowed across the two zones are matters of debate and negotiation.