Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Crisis or Detente?

Panel A

The good new is that until now resort to force has been avoided. Despite numerous near conflict situations in the post World War II period, as in 1955 and '74, '76, '87, and most recently, '96. The bad news, however, is that the possibility of conflict remains quite real due to miscalculation, misperception, limits testing, escalation, political instability, and internal problems in Turkey. In the latter case, Turkey may attempt to externalize her domestic problems by keeping the attention of the military focused on external, rather than on domestic issues.

Turkey's growing regional assertiveness in the post-Cold War era has been compounded by three factors. One is Turkey's growing sense of isolation as it increasingly perceives her neighbor's to be unfriendly. Second is Turkey's growing confidence in its military capability which has improved with external, material, and technical assistance and now threatens the qualitative balance with Greece. Third, the ambivalence of American policy towards Turkey's actions which has had the effect of encouraging regional instability and not moderating Turkey's behavior.

What we're likely to see then is the perpetuation of the Greco-Turkish dispute as both sides assert their rights, emphasize their commitment to declared positions, and attempt to keep these positions in front of the international community. We're also likely to see the continuation of the dispute along narrow and selective legal points. High levels of military spending are also likely, especially on the part of Greece who must maintain a qualitative balance of forces with Turkey.

Post-Cold War American appeals to Greece and Turkey to negotiate their differences in the interest of regional stability miss the lesson of the Cold War period. That is security considerations without other complementary conditions provide neither a stable nor a permanent foundation for Greco-Turkish detente. By 1955, the post-World War II Greco-Turkish detente collapsed under the strain of the Cyprus dispute and its impact on the Greek minority of Istanbul and the ecumenical Patriarchate.

In the final analysis, Greece, as a status quo power, expects that others will respect the status quo created by international agreements since 1923, respect the boundaries established by relevant international treaties, and will not threaten the use of force in conflict resolution. This is why there will be no moderation of the Greek position. That Greek sovereign rights and rights granted to Greece under international law will not be subverted under Turkey's threat of force or through pressure by Greece's allies and associates.

Time does not permit the presentation and discussion of the list of Greco-Turkish issues that are currently in dispute. Some of these issues are old, as in the case of minorities in Cyprus. Most of the other issues are relatively new and have come about since late in 1973 and particularly after the 1974 Turkish invasion and continuing occupation of Cyprus. The intensity by which Turkey has pursued this mix of old and new issues in the post-Cold War period, the constant threat of resorting to force against Greece, and the new claims as to gray areas in the Aegean, have confirmed the perception in Athens that Turkey is pursuing a calculated revisionist policy in the Aegean, in Thrace, and Cyprus with the toleration, if not also the support, of the United States and some key European allies.

This political consensus cuts across ideological lines in Greece. The differences that exist are only on the tactics that Greece needs to follow in order to counter Turkey's policies. No one should under estimate the depth of the political consensus that exists in Greece today on this particular issue. Greece, as a status quo power, has repeatedly stated it has no claims against Turkey. It only expects Turkey to conform with the rule of law. That is why Greek policies have been marked by patience, vigilance, readiness, restrained responses to constant provocations in the Aegean, and a willingness to negotiate over legitimate issues such as the limitation of the Aegean continental shelf, however, in the context of contemporary international law. Moreover, Greece has avoided extending its territorial waters to 12 miles, even though it has the right to do so under contemporary international law.

Greece, as a status quo power, faces the classic dilemma. How to defend the status quo without endangering its territorial integrity, its sovereign rights, and the rights granted to it under international agreements. Our negotiations, especially under Turkey's assertive policies and its threat to use force, a sign of Greek weakness. This question has attained new significance in the post-Cold War period. Turkey of course, according to Greece, has mastered the art of creating incidents, as in the case of Imia in January 1996, threatening to use force and then pulling back, calling for negotiations, and then of course calling on Greece to show similar flexibility.

But these calls for negotiations only add issues to an already overburdened agenda and involve concessions on the part of Greece of legally established rights. In this manner, Turkey presents itself as a peaceful member of international community and the objectives of its policy to be purely peaceful while Greece, of course, looks intransigent if it refuses to negotiate. Moreover, Turkey, because of its weak legal position, emphasizes political over judicial methods of conflict resolution.

It is in this context that since 1974, as well as in the post-Cold War period, that Greece and Turkey have engaged in an intermittent dialogue at all diplomatic levels. This has included summit meetings which have produced declarations of principals to guides the two countries on the road to detente. The latest of these declarations was the one of Madrid of July 8, 1997. But the declaration issued there met the fate of its predecessors following the escalation of Turkish provocations in the Aegean and in Cyprus and the failure of the two United Nations-United States sponsored rounds of talks between the president of Cyprus and the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. At least the recent meeting in Crete did not produce any grandiose statements, but at least it produced a modest, realistic sort of statement about the continuation of the dialogue rather than anything else.

Turkey, but also the United States, need to understand the following points about Greek policy. One, that no democratic Greek government can accept compromises questioning the legally established status quo and threatening Greek sovereignty in order to appease Turkey. Second, that Greece will not be brought into a Camp David negotiating format because it will involve political negotiations over all the issues raised by Turkey, regardless of their legal merit and their affect on Greek sovereignty and established legal rights. Such a method of conflict resolution would also uphold Turkey's preference for political over legal of conflict resolution because, as I said earlier, Turkey appears to have a much weaker legal position on most of these issues.

And third, that a package deal solution that includes the problem of Cyprus will not work. Cyprus is not a Greco-Turkish problem, but a problem of invasion and continuing occupation. Each set of problems, Cyprus and Greco-Turkish, has its own dynamics. Adding Cyprus to the list of Greco-Turkish disputes will complicate these issues and hold Cyprus to the other broader Greco-Turkish problems.

Fourth, that the United States and NATO are not seen as neutral in the Greco-Turkish dispute. Their unwillingness to take a clear stand on issues, such as the sanctity of treaties, of established boundaries and legal rights, and to condemn unequivocally Turkey's threat to use force against Greece and Cyprus, have undermined American credibility in Athens. NATO and the American response is perceived as an appeasement of Turkey which is likely to destabilize the region and not moderate Turkey's behavior or stabilize its government. And finally, five, in view of the recent incidents in the Aegean and in Cyprus, Turkey needs to recognize that neither Greece nor Cyprus are Turkey protectorates, nor do they recognize or accept Turkey's hegemonical position in the area.

Despite the positive developments, such as the Madrid and the Crete statements and the international interest in reviving the stalled Cyprus negotiations, regression, rather than progress towards Greco-Turkish detente, may be the legacy of 1997. Rhetorical as well as military escalation in the Aegean, military threats against Cyprus because of the acquisition of the S300 anti-aircraft defence system and Cyprus' defence cooperation with Greece and the planned integration of the occupied areas of Cyprus to Turkey are all negative developments that can be attributed to: One, the failure of the Cyprus talks in Troutbeck and Glion because of Turkey's attempt to legitimize the partition of Cyprus; Two, the failure of Turkey to block the process for the integration of Cyprus in the European Union and to reverse European opposition for its membership in the European Union;

Three, Turkey's attempt to create precedents restricting the freedom of navigation through the Straits despite the 1936 Montreux Treaty, by using environmental issues in the shipment of the S300s as excuses or rationalizations; fourth, using the military escalation in the Aegean to force an American and a NATO intervention in order to bring Greece to the negotiating table.

Turkey is aware that even the alleged American policy of equidistance works in favor of its claims because, t the minimum, it supports its demand for a political dialogue involving all issues in Greco-Turkish relations despite their legal merits.

At the close 1997, Athenian pragmatism has not been met in Ankara. Greece and Turkey continue to cooperate in the Black Sea in tourism and in trade. However, the political differences remain. Moreover, Greece, since December 1995, has opened the way for Turkey's progress in its relations with the European Union. The challenge is up to Turkey to meet the European Union's membership criteria and to behalf within the bounds of international law. Greek diplomats have a good understanding of the dilemmas and challenges facing Turkey at the end of the 20th century. Greece would prefer a secular and European oriented Turkey. But secularism alone does not guarantee either democracy or stability in Turkey or peaceful conduct vis-a-vis its neighbors.

In contrast to all other European countries, the Turkish constitution gives a unique place to the Turkish military in that country's political life. This fact is overlooked by most of Turkey's supported. It is this military establishment that defines and directs Turkey's policies in the Aegean and in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey's political instability, the role of the military, and the presence of Bulent Ecivet, the wild card in the present coalition government raises the inevitable question, who speaks for Turkey? That is an important question in view of the strained Greco-Turkish relations.

Post-Cold War Greek-Turkish relations are at an important turning point. Turkey looms larger in Greek thinking than Greece does in Turkish thinking. The reasons are clear. In the former case, we have Turkey's assertive policies and its growing military capabilities that pose a threat to the Greek islands and to Cyprus. In the latter case, Greece is less of a military threat and more a political irritant. It is also an easy scapegoat and a rationalization for Turkey's internal problems. Greek status quo realistic policies have not been met by Turkey. If the current level of escalation continues, it will make it harder for any Greek government to negotiate with Turkey on any issue. And it will set back Greece's economic progress which of course is required by the Maastricht Treaty.

The challenge of Greco-Turkish detente is monumental, but is not impossible. The minimum that is required of Turkey is an unqualified renunciation of the threat of force in Greco-Turkish relations and an unqualified acknowledgement of the status quo as established by the Treaties of Lausanne, Montreux, and Paris. A settlement of the Cyprus problem within the context of the new opportunities presented by the membership of Cyprus in the European Union will certainly contribute to an improved Greco-Turkish political climate. Turkey's failure to do so will imply that the Aegean is likely to remain a sea of confrontation instead of being a bridge of cooperation. Thank you very much.

Nicolaidis: We will continue with Professor Tozun Bahcheli from King's College, Canada. Who has been in this area before with ...(inaudible) the Cyprus conference. So I'm delighted to have him back. He is a professor of political science at King's College in London, Canada where he teaches course in international, Middle Eastern and Balkan politics. During the past 20 years, he has conducted research and written on Turkish foreign policy, the Cyprus conflict and other Greek-Turkish issues. His articles have appeared in various journals and his book Greek-Turkish Since 1955 was published by Westview Press in 1990.

During the 1995-96 academic year, Bahcheli was a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C. Bahcheli holds a B.A./M.A. in political science from the University of Western Ontario and a Ph.D. in international relations from the London School of Economics. The title of his talk is "The Quest for a Cyprus Settlement and Implications for Greek-Turkish Relations". Professor Bahcheli.

Bahcheli: I want to begin with an apology for you bringing you Canadian weather, folks. I was actually hoping that when I arrived last night, that I'd be enjoying milder, balmy weather compared to what we have in my neck of the woods. I want to think very much Dimitris Keridis, Eleni Mahaira-Odoni, and Nikos Zahariadis for organizing this timely conference and for having me here.

Since the mandate of the papers of this panel is to deal with security issues, I'll begin by noting recent changes in the security environment that have had significant repercussions on relations between Greece and Turkey. I'll be making four points. I'll then focus on this Cyprus issue. And I will try to explain how the European Union issue will pose additional challenges to Greek-Turkish relations and the settlement of the island's communal(?) dispute.

It has now become conventional wisdom that since the end of the Cold War, that the principal element of cohesion among NATO members has disappeared and that this will have implications in managing Greek-Turkish relations. Will the United States and NATO have the same clout after the end of the Cold War as before to restrain Athens and Ankara and ensure that their conflicting interests do not lead to an escalation of the conflict and possible war. The question is apt, but the answer is not entirely clear. Even though one could reasonably argue that there has been some diminution of U.S. leverage in Athens and Ankara.

Consider the dramatic reduction of U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey since the end of the Cold War. In the case of Greece, let me give some figures. In 1997, the amount of aid that Greece is receiving from the United States is just over $100 million. That is about 2% of what Greece receives from EU coffers annually. Which is $5 billion. Having said that though, I think the U.S. ability to deal with the Greek-Turkish crisis and their conduct in January of 1996, nonetheless is a reminder that the U.S. remains the power which has the most leverage over Greeks and Turks, if not the Cypriot parties.

The second point I'd make is that in dealing with the challenges that the United States faces since the end of the Cold War in the Middle East, in the Caucasus, in the Balkans, that it has put a substantial premium on its strategic collaboration with Turkey. By comparison, Greece's strategic value has declined in the eyes of the foreign policy establishment in Washington. On the other hand of course, Greece has enjoyed a substantial diplomatic advantage vis-a-vis Turkey thanks to its EU membership.

The third point I'd make, and this is a make that Dr. Coufoudakis has also referred to, is that the military balance between Greece and Turkey is in Turkey's favor. There's been a gradual shift actually to Turkey's favor and the Turks have embarked on an extensive and expensive military modernization program and are likely to maintain their military superiority. And fourthly, in general, one could say that Greek-Turkish relations have become less stable and that Greek and Turkish governments have become exasperated, more fed up with one another than ever before. And I think we can cite the January 1996 crises over Imia-Kardak as a reminder of how incendiary Greek-Turkish relations have become.

Now the Greek complaints of Turkey and Turkish complaints of Greece have been dealt with by Dr. Coufoudakis in his very comprehensive presentation. I'll just very briefly go over them and then plunge into Cyprus. One point though, the arena for Turkish rivalry has expanded. They are now competing in the Balkans as they didn't before. And I think this is creating new irritants, new hassles. Greece's concern about the close relationships that Turkey appears to be establishing with countries that Greece has had troubled relations with in the past and present, like Macedonia and Albania. But the big issue of course is Greece's perception of Turkey's threat to its territorial integrity.

Practically every Greek believes that the Imia-Kardak crisis was an acid test of Turkey's real intentions to roll back the territorial ...(inaudible) on the Aegean. And on Cyprus of course, Greeks, much as Greek Cypriots are fed up that there is no movement on the Turkish position after nearly a quarter century after the War of 1974. The Turkish position is as hard line as ever, there are more Turkish troops than ever on Cyprus.

As for the Turkish grievances that Van didn't deal with so much, it wasn't his job to do that of course, the Turks themselves look at Greece and see a major threat. As much as they have other more pressing threats in their neighborhood, they do see Greece as a state that is bent on weakening Turkey. The secular establishment is troubled most of all with the obstruction that Greece poses to Turkey's developing closer relations with Europe and, in particular, the EU, regular use of the Greek veto and so on is very troublesome to the Turks. The Turks are troubled very much with the diplomatic victory, as they see it, of Greece in securing the EU commitment to begin accession talks with the Greek Cypriot run Republic of Cyprus.

They are turning to other issues. The Turks are troubled with what they believe, anyway, this is hotly denied by Greece I know, of Greek assistance to the PKK, the Kurdistan Workers Party, which is waging a major gorilla insurgency against Turkey. And they also, as much as the Turks complain that the Greeks are paranoid about Turkey, the Turks themselves have their own paranoia. They see Greece as leading some kind of Orthodox alliance to encircle Turkey. The budding relationship that Greece has established with Russia. Recently, as you know, there was - I don't know whether it took place or not - there were plans for naval maneuvers by Russia and Greece in the Aegean.

Greece's establishment of military cooperation agreements with Armenia, its efforts to enlist Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, all of these Orthodox or partially Orthodox states to encircle Turkey. This is something that is bothersome to the Turks. And more directly recently, the measures that Greece has taken to increase its military presence in Cyprus and working together with the Greek Cypriot authorities there to change the military balance in Greek favor. And, as you well know, the Turks were extremely upset with the purchase or proposed purchase, rather, of the S300 service to air missiles that the Greek Cypriot government plans to deploy in South Cyprus and which Turkey has threatened to remove by force.

Let me focus on Cyprus now. I'll be talking about Cyprus rather than the Aegean with the following caveats. I recognize that there's an interconnectedness between the Aegean and the Cyprus issues. There's a big question mark here for which I have no adequate answer. It has been raised by Richard Holbrook, it has also been raised by Ambassador Stearns numerous times. Can Athens and Ankara settle the Cyprus issues without tackling their Aegean problems? The Greeks and the Turks have been telling Holbrook yes, go ahead and deal with Cyprus. But he will surely be wondering whether there would have to be a comprehensive Greek-Turkish settlement in order to solve the Cyprus issue.

As to my justification for focusing on Cyprus, it is mostly because it is very much on the agenda of the international community and the object of vigorous interest on the part of important third parties; the United States, the United Nations, and the EU. Cyprus is a highly internationalized issue. By comparison, the Aegean issues between Greece and Turkey have remained essentially bilateral. Moreover, and here I'm somewhat more optimistic than Dr. Coufoudakis, I contend that there's a potential to defer the resolution of the Aegean issues to a later date. The two rivals can live with the Aegean status quo.

Cyprus though is a different matter. And partly because of the EU factor. Because Brussels has committed itself to start accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus, the EU clock is ticking. Many Cyprus watchers are saying that there is an inexorable move toward a resolution.

Bahcheli: --given the Cypriot authorities and their respective counterparts in Ankara and Athens. Nonetheless, one could state generally that Turkish Cypriots and Ankara favor the status quo whereas Greek Cypriots and Athens are working energetically to ensure that the status quo does not become permanent and that the island is reunited. What I find notable is that during the past three to four years and perhaps longer, there has been very close collaboration between Greek Cypriots and Athens on the one hand and Turkish Cypriots and Ankara on the other on the issue that is dominating the Cyprus discussions: EU membership. Let me look at the Greek and Greek Cypriot position first and then compare it to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot position.

The overriding interest in EU membership for Greece and Greek Cypriots is not economic, but driven by political and security considerations. With a reunited island as a member and given Ankara's own interest in membership, it is anticipated by Greece and Greek Cypriots that the EU pressure would bring an end to Turkey's military presence on the island. Even if Greek Cyprus joins the EU without Turkish Cypriots, as EU citizens they would feel more secure vis-a-vis Turkey. There's an additional advantage for Greek Cypriots in that EU rules would strengthen their negotiating position as they argue for freedom of settlement and purchase throughout the envisaged federation.

Now Athens and Greek Cypriots believe that EU membership in Cyprus will also be in the interests of both Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. There is the economic incentive. Turkish Cypriots are poorer. Their isolation is costing them. So I think there's a genuine feeling on the part of, many Greeks could express, that Turkish Cypriot would see a very substantial improvement in their living standards, in their level of prosperity if they become EU citizens along with Greek Cypriots. For Ankara, the advantage of a united Cyprus being in the EU would be that, since Turkish Cypriots would be partners in this envisaged federation, that that would mean that Cyprus would favorable, wouldn't be an impediment to Turkish membership aspirations in the future.

Plus of course both Athens and Greek Cypriots feel that, and I believe they're right, that, you know, Cyprus is an impediment to Turkey's closer relationship with the EU and that impediment would be removed. I think there is a genuine puzzlement, a genuine disappointment on the part of many Greek Cypriots and Greeks that these incentives are not seen as such, are not deciding factors in Turkish policy.

I turn now to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot position. They see a trap in EU membership for Cyprus. Most importantly, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot officials are concerned that with the island's EU membership that Turkey's continuing guarantee and military presence would be difficult to justify. At least in the long run. In addition, they reject the EU as a neutral broker as well. Even without the Greek presence, they perceive an EU bias against Turkey.

As for the Turkish Cypriots, they have this additional concern, they're afraid that their political status as a community would become vulnerable if they joined the EU. This would be overcome if Turkey also became a member of the EU, but there are many obstacles to Turkish entry. Partly because, but not entirely, because of Greek objections. Both Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots feel so strongly about this issue that they have threatened to integrate North Cyprus, the TNRC, with Turkey if the EU begins accession talks with Greek Cyprus as scheduled. In their turn, Greek Cypriots and the Greek government have threatened to veto the EU plans for expansion if Cyprus accession talks are shelved.

I conclude now, folks, by stating that the EU has become an increasingly divisive issue. It is pitting Greeks and Turks against one another. And I'm afraid that Brussels is unlikely to provide answers for the Cyprus dilemma. In fact, wittingly or unwittingly, I think mostly unwittingly naturally, the EU could worsen the Cyprus problem and further complicate Greek and Turkish relations.

In any case, given the dismal state of relations between Athens and Ankara and the Cypriot communities and the domestic constraints that Dr. Coufoudakis mentioned that I'm sure will be cited and examined at greater length in the other presentation, in Greece and particularly Turkey with its insecure coalition government, it is unlikely that any attempt to settle the Cyprus will be successful in the near future. In the circumstances, it would be wiser to focus on conflict management, step by step modest improvements that Eleni Odoni mentioned and spoke in favor of at the very beginning. Confidence building in both the Aegean and Cyprus to ensure that small incidents do not become serious confrontations.

Mahaira-Odoni: (Housekeeping) Our next speaker I'm very happy to present is a very dear friend and very dear friend of this study group from the very beginning, Ambassador Monteagle Stearns. Who served, together with Tom Niles, I must say in the last 25 years, in my view, two most successful ambassadors to Greece. He has served as U.S. Ambassador to Greece from 1981 to 1985. As a career foreign service officer, he was also U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Ivory Coast from 1976 to 1979 and vice president of the National Defense University from 1979 to 1981.

Since leaving the foreign service in 1987, he has been Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.; Warburg Professor of International Relations at Simmons College in Boston; Whitney H. Shepardson Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York; and an associate and affiliate of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.

In 1992, his book Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus was published by the council on Foreign Relations. Parenthetically, I was the happy translator into Greek. A Greek edition was published the same year by PONTIKI press in Athens. Ambassador Stearns recently completed a book on American diplomacy for the 20th Century Fund, entitled Talking to Strangers; Improving American Diplomacy at Home and Abroad. Ambassador Stearns' talk is entitled "The Security Domain: A. U.S. Perspective". Ambassador Stearns.

Stearns: Thank you, Eleni. Ladies and gentlemen, delighted to be here. Although coming in from Framingham, I strayed into Greek and Turkish territorial waters, was buzzed by F16s, lost my windshield wipers. In any event, we're happy to be here.

I did not provide a paper to Dr. Zahariadis, explaining to him that I simply didn't, I had too much on my plate to do so. But I did provide him with an outline of the remarks that I intended to make and from that outline, I'm going to take two aspects to discuss with you. The first is what exactly is U.S. interest in the Eastern Mediterranean and, by extension, in Greek-Turkish differences after the Cold War. And second, what can the U.S. do, if anything, to assist Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus to resolve these long standing problems that seem to have been aggravated rather than ameliorated during the course of the Cold War.

It's striking to me that Greece and Turkey are among the oldest military allies of the United States. After all, the Truman Doctrine was declared two years before the formation of NATO. And that special relationship with Greece and Turkey on the part of the U.S. might have been expected to mitigate the differences of the two countries, whether bilateral or in Cyprus. And I think it's a mark of the failure of American diplomacy that, far from mitigating those differences, the course of the Cold War saw the differences become more acute. And as Van Coufoudakis and Tozun Bahcheli mentioned and Eleni as well, last summer saw a whole series of mini crises. And our experience with international affairs, particularly in the post-Cold War world suggest that mini crises can become maxi crises if attention isn't paid to them.

U.S. interest in the Eastern Mediterranean, what exactly is it after the Cold War? I think that our stakes in fact have increased in this area. During the Cold War, those of us who were working on what we liked to call the southeastern flank of NATO used to feel somewhat neglected because the priorities and the lion's share of resource of the alliance were first given to the central European flank. I remember as a Fellow here at Harvard in 1972-73, my army colleague was delighted that at the end of our fellowship year his assignment was to the army command in charge of the Volde(?) Gap. As he said, this is where the Soviets are going to break through and he was there to keep his bayonet in the dike.

But aside from periodic attempts at shuttle diplomacy from Naples to try to find ways in which Greece and Turkey could be persuaded to participate in NATO exercises, the responsibilities of the alliance in the southeastern flank were minimal. Neal Crowe(sp?) and other SINK south commanders in Naples exhausted an enormous amount of imagination and ingenuity in devising scenarios which it was hoped would not drive either Greece or Turkey out of a planned exercise either in the fall or in the spring as the normal cycle of NATO exercises runs. But there was no question that the southeastern flank came in second, if not third, in NATO's list of priorities.

We've seen in the last couple of years a very significant change. The Secretary General of NATO is a Mediterranean. Secretary General Soulana(sp?), by definition, has a Mediterranean perspective. And we've seen the principle western diplomatic and military initiatives in the last two years to have been in Bosnia and, before that, in the Gulf with a continuing preoccupation to prevent the total collapse of the Israeli-PLO accords. So that NATO and the West, the U.S. in particular, have raised the ante in the eastern Mediterranean. This is where our principle diplomatic initiatives and risks have been taken and our principle military effort has been devoted. This is not going to change.

The fact that the 6th Fleet is in the Mediterranean, the U.S. position in rebuffing the French initiative, arguing that the Naples Southern Allied Forces Command should be transferred to European, these are clear indications that for as far ahead as we can see, the U.S. intends to play a Mediterranean role and to keep in its own hands the command and the control arrangements which originate in half(?) south.

To summarize, the principle objectives, U.S. objectives in the eastern Med, we could say the following: secure access to Middle East oil; free navigation of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean; implementation of the Dayton Accords; salvaging of the Israeli-Arab peace process; and containment of Islamic fundamentalism. Now all of these objectives can be thwarted by a continued aggravation of Greek-Turkish differences and a failure to find a solution in Cyprus. No one of those objectives is enhanced by continuing Greek-Turkish differences .

I attended a seminar on the other side of town about a month ago and I heard a distinguished academic who had in fact served in the State Department at one time say that while it would be too bad if Greece and Turkey went to war, he didn't think that would be a catastrophe for U.S. policy. I couldn't disagree more heartily. Unfortunately, he was called away to conduct another seminar so none of us had an opportunity to argue with him.

But it does seem to me perfectly clear, first, that the failure of the U.S. to do more to assist Greece and Turkey to solve underlying problems during the Cold War created an ethical, if you will, moral responsibility on the part of the U.S. to continue to be interested in the problem in a helpful way if that's possible. And secondly, because of the clearly defined and increased U.S. interests in the area, we should recognize that it is in, from a very pragmatic standpoint, it is in U.S. interests to assist the Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots more effectively than we have.

Now what can the U.S. do that won't make the situation worse? Because on occasion we have in fact inadvertently made the situation worse. I agree wholly with Eleni that this is a fox problem, not a hedgehog problem. And those of us who have worked on foreign affairs in the U.S. government and those of you who have studied it from outside, know that the U.S. is essentially, diplomatically speaking, a hedgehog power. We like big, total solutions. If it were possible to wrap up the Aegean, the bilateral problems of Greece and Turkey in the Aegean and the Cyprus problem into one package, we would be delighted to do so. But this is not going to work. We're going to have to be able to approach these problems piecemeal .

Tozun and I have talked often about whether the Aegean and Cyprus can be separated. And as Tozun said, he recognizes that there is a linkage, but that the Aegean situation could be so explosive that any attempt to resolve the Aegean problems would make the Cyprus problem even worse, less manageable. And yet, for me, it isn't the question so much of a direct linkage between the Aegean and Cyprus, the question is whether the Cyprus problem can be resolved without a substantial improvement in Greek-Turkish bilateral relations. And if not, whether Greek-Turkish bilateral relations can be improved without addressing the problems of the Aegean.

I think that as difficult as it will be to tackle the Aegean problems without aggravating-- Our chairman has arrived. (Applause) That we're going to have to bite the bullet and do our best to improve the situation in the Aegean. I once talked with President Clerides, when he was leader of the Rally Party in Opposition, and I observed that the Cypriot flag seemed to me to be designed more with a view to avoiding offense than to inspiring patriotism. And President Clerides said to me, "It's the best flag in the world." And I said, "Why, Mr. President?" And he said, "Because nobody would die for it." He was right. And many have died for it unfortunately, but not for the flag itself, not for the flag of unity.

Greek-Turkish Cypriots feel more like Greeks than they feel like Turkish Cypriots and conversely true of Turkish Cypriots. So that I think that it's going to require a major effort on the part of Greece and Turkey. And I think that the U.S. role should be confined to supplying that missing element of confidence between Greece and Turkey. To make absolutely clear that neither the United States nor NATO will permit a less than peaceful solution to both the bilateral problems and the problem of Cyprus.

I think Dick Holbrook and Tom Miller are right in not trying to float a plan for Cyprus. Whatever plan they proposed would, in all likelihood, be rejected by one or both sides. It's going to require the imagination and the good will and the recognition on the part of Greece, Turkey, and Nicosia, as well as Mr. Denktash, if that is possible, that too many resources are being expended, too much treasure is being squandered in the present situation to let it continue indefinitely.

And those in Greece in particular who hope that the U.S. will come up with a solution are bound to be disappointed. Yesterday or the day before, I was going over notes from a conference in Taliwahr(sp?) in September of 1989. And the subject of the conference was how will the U.S. adjust to an integrated Europe. And the senior representative from the National Security Council was present at the conference. And at one point he said, according to my notes, "Those of you who talk about a weakening of the Soviet Union are absolutely wrong. The Soviet Union is still strong, it's still an eminent threat to the U.S. and the situation in Germany has never been worse."

Why do I quote that? That was two months before the fall of the Berlin wall. I quote it only to remind you, if any of us needs reminding, that big powers can be wrong and their policy makers are often wrong. Even on big issues like the collapse of the Soviet Union and the unification of Germany. And therefore we are much more likely to be wrong about more complicated, impacted and nuanced problems like those of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. So the ideas should come from Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia because the ideas likely to come from Washington I think would not meet the needs of the situation. Thank you.

Mahaira-Odoni: Before we introduce the next speaker, I would very much like to introduce one of the major conceivers of this project, Professor Nikos Zahariadis, whom I am very relieved to see, let me just tell you. Yes, absolutely. He has received his Ph.D. '92 in political science from the University of Georgia. He's assistant professor of political science and international relations at the State University New York in New Paltz. He is the recipient of the Samuel H. Beer Dissertation Prize by the British Politics Group and the Distinguished Teacher of the Year Award by the State University of New York-New Paltz. His research, funded by the Foundation for Hellenic Studies and the State University of New York manager others, focuses on European political economy and Balkan nationalism and security. He is the author of Markets, States, and Public Policy: Privatization in Britain and France (University of Michigan Press), and the editor of two others on Theory and Method in Comparative Politics and Contending Perspectives in International Political Economy. His work has also appeared in numerous journals including International Studies Quarterly, Political Science Quarterly, Mediterranean Quarterly, and others. Professor Zahariadis, would you like to take this seat?

Zahariadis: I apologize to the audience. I guess I learned my lesson. Next time fly, don't drive. (simultaneous conversation) And to my left, I have Mr. Philip Gordon who is a director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the U.K. and he'll give us a European perspective of the security domain of Greek-Turkish relations. Mr. Gordon.

Gordon: Thank you very much. I'm conscious of course of the fact that my comments will be the only ones heard by their respondent, which may leave me uniquely vulnerable to his rebuttal. But so be it. Let me say one other caveat at the beginning, I am indeed going to talk about European perspectives, but let it be clear so that there's no false advertising, that I myself am American. I do live in London and teach in France, but I hope I can share with your some insights and perspectives on European perspectives. This is more a comment on European views rather than an authentic horse's mouth European view.

There are five things that I want to talk about. The first is to distinguish European from American perspectives on Greece-Turkey. Second, to have a look at the policy consequences of those different perspectives. Third, a word on how Europe views the Aegean disputes. Fourth, looking at differences among Europeans. And fifth, talking about European and the EU approaches to Cyprus.

On the first point, and I hope my American background in presence in Europe qualifies me to talk about this, I want to emphasize what I think are differences between the U.S. and Europe and the way they look at Greece-Turkey. I think there are significant differences and I think those differences have gotten greater at the end of the Cold War. I would describe it, broadly speaking, like this. I think the United States tends to see Balkan issues, particularly Greece-Turkey, through the prism of global geopolitics and, in particular, Middle Eastern security.

Whereas Europe see the region largely through the prism of EU politics. Not that is to say for the United States, Turkey is strategically as important as ever and probably more important than ever. Whereas as the European Union is obliged, because it pays less attention to global geostrategy, to pay more attention to Greek interests within the European Union. Richard Holbrook, among many others, talks about this a lot.

A quote from Richard Holbrook that I think is indicative of this American perspective is the following. He said recently that Turkey's at the crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the United States on the Eurasian continent. NATO, the Balkans, the Aegean, Iraqi sanctions, Russian relations with the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, peace in the Middle East, and transit routes for Central Asian oil and gas. That seems to me to describe the way Americans think about these issues. The crisis in Iraq this week underlines that even more. Americans see Turkey as absolutely vital in these regards.

Now one could qualify this U.S. view a little bit by saying the administration, that's not Congress. Congress would take a different perspective and think more about issues of human rights, democracy and so on. That distinction needs to be made. But still I think this U.S. government is going to think about these issues through that prism. Mark Grossman, of course, former ambassador to Turkey, assistant secretary of state for Europe, these influences will be important.

This is also not to say that Europeans don't think about all of these other issues; Iraqi sanctions, Middle East peace, Caspian oil. Of course Europeans think about these things as well. But I would argue less than Americans and that this has policy consequences for the way the two actors, U.S. and Europe, approach Greece-Turkey issues.

So what are these consequences? What are the policy differences between the European policies and American policies? Again, to simplify a little bit, it seems to me since the U.S.' overwhelming interest, strategic interest, is in a stable Western oriented Turkey, Americans place overwhelming priority on integrating Turkey into the Western community. I think there are plenty of examples of this. The emphasis put on Turkey in NATO, the active support of the United States of Turkey's inclusion in the Customs Union with the EU. The Americans pushed very hard for that and were very interested in seeing it happen. The recent strengthening of U.S.-Turkey defense ties, the Pentagon efforts to improve those ties and revitalize the relationship with Turkey.

Particularly after the election of an Islamist government a real concern in the United States and in the Pentagon about losing Turkey. Along the lines of who lost China. Nobody wanted to lose turkey. The U.S. Commerce Department listed Turkey among the ten big emerging markets. And the administration has pushed, against some Congressional resistance, to complete arm transfers that had been held up by Congress. All of this seems to me to show an overwhelming desire of the United States to integrate Turkey into the West lest we lose it to the East because we need its cooperation on so many matters.

Thus while U.S. policy is influenced by these strategic factors, I think European policy is influenced more by EU politics and therefore, Greek influence because of course of Greece's membership in the EU and also through the role of the European parliament, considerations of democracy and human rights. And therefore, EU policy tend toward, and I'm not saying they're designed toward this, but they tend more toward exclusion of Turkey than inclusion of Turkey.

Again, EU policy is not to exclude Turkey, but inevitably - I think the opposite of the case, the EU policy is also interested in including Turkey as much possible - but inevitably internal EU imperatives result more in the exclusion of Turkey. The unwillingness to offer Turkey a clear prospective of EU membership, the beginning of accession negotiations with Cyprus, but not with Turkey, the EU invitations to at least five, we'll find out precisely how many, Central European states who applied to join the EU well after Turkey did, a European tendency to side with Greece in the Aegean disputes, and pressure from the European Parliament and sometimes Greece to hold off aid to Turkey.

Now again, there are legitimate reasons and explanations for all of these policies that tend to lead towards a Turkish feeling of exclusion. I'm not discussing for the moment of all of these, I'm just observing them. And I think the consequence is that the EU does more to protect Greece's perceived interests than it does those of Turkey . And the result of all of that, it seems to me, is that while failing to entirely satisfy Greece, which would like to see even more solidarity from the EU - it's not as if, I would think, Greece shares the perspective I just put forth - but while failing to entirely satisfy Greece, the EU even more offends Turkey and the EU relations with Turkey are not very good.

Let me say a word about the Aegean and where it fits into this picture. I think for all of the above reasons, the EU tends to see the Aegean dispute more in line with Greek perspectives than with Turkish ones. European countries of course support Greece's view that the convention on the law of the sea should apply to the Aegean, that international law should determine territory in territorial waters, that Greece has a legal right to its 12 mile limit, even though it advises that it shouldn't exercise it, and that Greek inhabited and even uninhabited islands in the Aegean, however close to the Turkish mainland, are unambiguously Greek. During the time of the Imia-Kardak crisis, I think European leaders were very critical of Turkish actions. Thus, because of the way the EU sees problems, they tend on these issues to see it through Greek eyes.

But I think it's very important to stress, and this is where I would put my stress, the limits on this EU solidarity with Greece on these issues. Greece has often been disappointed with the amount of support it gets from the EU on Aegean issues. It was disappointed when the Western European Union made it clear that even though Greece could fully join the Western European Union, a Greece-Turkey war wouldn't be covered by the defense guarantees of the WEU, which of course is precisely one of the reasons why Greece wanted to be in the WEU in the first place.

I think that is very symbolically indicative of the amount of support Greece can really expect from its EU partners. And I'm not surprised that many Greeks are frustrated with the amount of solidarity they get from the EU. It's not what they would ideally like to see a union be. I think another example of the same point is Greek efforts to incorporate a commitment to territorial integrity into the Amsterdam Treaty so that it would be even more clear that, if you're a member of the EU, your territory is guaranteed by the other members of the EU. Some people would like to think this goes without saying. Greeks would rather have said it. But they found resistance to saying such things among their European partners.

And therefore it seems to me that the harsh reality of it all is that if a military conflict were to erupt in the Aegean, perhaps as a spill over from some clash in Cyprus, which seems to be more likely - I agree with those on the panel who suggested that in and of itself, the Aegean status quo is more or less bearable and unlikely to burst into a conflict, but an Aegean conflict could result from a conflict in Cyprus - if that were to happen, it seems to me very unlikely that Greece could count on European military backing in a military conflict with Turkey. For all the talk of a common EU foreign security policy, I think the Europeans are unlikely ever to show the sort of solidarity Greece would ideally like and expect.

Fourth point. I've been talking about the Europeans. As I said at the beginning, I think should be qualified. We can't pretend that there is any more solidarity among the other members of the EU than there is once Greece is included. I think there are different perspectives from Europe on these issues that range what I would suggest is perhaps the most sympathetic to Turkish causes, which would be Britain, and I hear this a lot in London, especially Conservatives. And we could talk about whether there are really party differences on this, but a lot of British Conservatives see this very much through Turkish eyes and are very critical of Greece and sympathetic to Turkey.

And then a spectrum that runs through most of the EU states to, obviously, Greece itself and Germany, which is also not very able to accommodate Turkish causes. And when I say able, I'm not saying willing to. There are obvious explanations of why Greece and Germany are less able to accommodate the Turkish perspectives. And in between these two, call this British sympathy for Turkey and Greece and Germany less so, there's a spectrum that is governed, to be honest, as I think a certain amount of indifference. Many of the countries in between see the Greek-Turkish issue as a problem or a headache. Rather than feeling they have some sort of stake in it, they just wish it would go away and they look for ways to help it go away without really feeling a large stake in it.

Now I mentioned Germany on one side of this perspective and I think that's the one deserving the most comment because of the strength of German feeling and of course the role of Germany within the EU. This is the most important position of any European country. Why are the Germans so skeptical of Turkey? Why do they support polices that, I suggested earlier, tend toward the exclusion of Turkey? A number of factors, but the two that I would mention are obvious and I think known to everyone here. First of all the numbers of Turks, ethnic Turks living in Germany is one and obviously the free movement of labor issue is what's most related to that.

I think when Germany thinks about Turkey as an EU member, they're obsessed with this idea of free movement of labor within the European Union. They picture tens, hundreds of thousands, millions of Turks coming to live in Germany. They have enough problems with ethnic assimilation in the situation right now. Chancellor Kohl is all too aware of all of this and just cannot face the idea of putting forth a prospect for that happening with his country. I think that's dominant. Some people like to suggest maybe this could be fudged. Turkey becoming an EU member without free movement of labor.

But that would be linked to the second reason I think Germany is so particularly adverse to Turkish membership in the EU. Which is that it would really undermine this continued German hope that one day you would have a true federation in Europe. It seems to me if and when Turkey joins the EU, that's over. It's probably over anyway. But if Turkey, with its population, borders, geopolitical situation and so on, joined the EU, no one anymore it seems to me could hope that there would one day be a federation with a genuine common foreign security policy, common currency, all of the freedoms, and so on. Until Germans are ready to abandon this idea for good, I think they're unlikely to even contemplate the prospect of Turkish membership in the European Union.

I saw a German headline the other day that really symbolized this for me. There was a headline in the Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung in October, "Soll die EU an Iran Grenzen?" Should the EU really have borders with Iran? And obviously this is a rhetorical question because the unstated answer is of course not, we never will. So long as this is the case, and as I suggested it's going to be the case for a long time, it seems to me prospects for Turkey joining the EU will remain poor.

The last point on Cyprus that many others have already discussed, let me just say where I think this plays into EU, is of course the most salient issue and perhaps the main reason why many of us are following these issues today. Because Cyprus has galvanized the Greece-Turkey issue that, to be honest, many people wouldn't be paying much attention to otherwise. It's because now with this, as someone said, the EU clock ticking, people know they're going to have to pay attention to this issue because it has all sorts of implications for all sorts of issues.

I think the EU's expressed hope that the carrot of EU membership, along with the stick of threatening to negotiate with the Greek Cypriots alone, the idea that this would be enough to provoke the Turkish Cypriots into an agreement on Cyprus is understandable, but I think naive. We know why the EU did this. It was necessary to secure the possibility of other aspects of EU enlargement. The British supported that. It was also necessary to secure the Customs Union agreement and that was an interest of many of the Europeans and particularly, again, the British. The real question is why the British let this go because they're now the ones most concerned about it.

Why did the British let this go ahead? I think there was two reasons to explain it. They wanted the Customs Union, they wanted other enlargements. So they said okay. Now I think, to be honest, some felt we'll deal with this later, this is not really going to happen. But now it's a very serious issue, it's on the agenda, and they're stuck with the consequences. I said I thought it was naive because I think the prospects for this EU membership galvanizing the Cypriot sides into an agreement are very poor. I think it's a fallacy to think that economic incentives such as those that have been mentioned are enough to persuade insecure minorities that they no longer need to protect their rights.

I think Ambassador Stearns alluded to this concept. When you look at Serbs in Croatia before they were expelled, look at Kurds in Turkey, look at whatever ethnic group you like, all would be economically better off if they gave up their aspirations to identity, security, and so on. But that doesn't often reassure them.

So how will this work out? I've raised this question and will conclude with it not because I think I have the answer, but because I think it's a nice question that we put to ourselves all and I hope we can talk it through a little bit. How will this work out? It seems to me there are only three possible options. Either one, it does work out along the way that it was hoped. The EU begins accession negotiations. This galvanizes Turkish Cypriots, there's an agreement on the island, Holbrook comes back with a piece of paper, and maybe they can negotiate this in Dayton, and it says, "We've done it. We have an agreement on the island. Cyprus joins the EU. Turkey agrees to that." And all of this works out wonderfully. I've already suggested I don't think that's going to happen.

Second theoretical possibility is that the EU gives up. And I think there are plenty of people in Europe, including at the EU itself, who think they can get away with something like that. Okay, in good faith, we offered to begin accession negotiations, we tried to push the sides to an agreement, we sent David Hanay(sp?) to try to do what he could and get them to agree. They didn't agree. We regret that very much, but we can't incorporate such a dispute into the EU. Very sorry, Athens, very sorry, Greek Cypriots, but, you know, we've got to move on and we're going to take five others into the EU, we'll address this some other time.

That's how I think a lot of people would like this to work out. But again, these things are never so simple. The EU is committed to this. And interestingly enough, I think there are some rather strong statements coming from the EU that they're not going to do just that. Hans Vandenbrook(sp?) I think has been very clear that this is a commitment to negotiate seriously and that they will negotiate if there's not an agreement on the island. I see Robin Cook recently said this, "We have made a commitment that Cyprus should have an opportunity to join the EU and this is not dependent on resolving the division of the island." The EU's agenda 2000 has said the very same thing.

Now politicians can always walk away from what they've said and maybe these are ways of, again, trying to push the parties to agree by threatening that they're do this if not. But when politicians get too far with these statements, they're hard to walk away from.

Which leads us to the third theoretical possibility that, again if you exclude the first that we're going to get lucky and this will all work out, the third one is that the EU takes in Cyprus, but without a deal. And it seems to me that the consequences of that have already been thought through and it does seem to me that TRNC would be incorporated into Turkey. And there I'll only comment again, inviting us to discuss these options because it seems to me I would like to hear from Greek participants and knowledgeable participant how they think this could play through and what Greeks could accept. Because what I forgot to mention is that there are many in the EU that hope to buy off Greece with something other than Cypriot membership. And I'd like to hear people say whether they think that's possible.

But my last one is that if it does work out in this last way, that Cyprus comes in, the northern part doesn't and rather is incorporated into Turkey, that would be ironic because the goal of the EU in offering Cyprus accession was that it would force the parties to lead to an integration. Rather the result of it would be the partition of Cyprus. Thank you very much.

Zahariadis: I would like to take five minutes now to explore a little bit. Since you didn't have the opportunity to hear my initial comments on how this whole workshop was conceived, there is a purpose behind it, and it's not simply to discuss interesting and important issue. There is a logic behind all of this and there is a direction. And I'd like now to, since I've had the opportunity, not to hear the comments of my colleagues or some of my colleagues, but I've seen their abstracts so I have an idea of what we're driving at, I'd like to weave some of those arguments into a framework. And I'd like to design a framework that I think will give us food for thought, for some resolution to Greek-Turkish issues.

And let me begin by saying that the framework is threefold, it has three steps. One is there is a diagnosis of what's going on. Number two, there is a stabilization area. Because there is deteriorating conditions between the two countries, the very first thing that needs to happen is to stop this sliding. So the third thing then is improvement of relations between the two. And then I'll end with overall recommendations. (Housekeeping)

The essence. What's the essence of relations between the two countries and why are they deteriorating as much as they are? I believe the essence is because they both lay claim to the same land. The Turks like some of the area of the Aegean, the Greeks say they have claim to the Aegean, and we have problems. One can conceive these relations as an endurance race for lack of a better term. That is you can think of the continental shelf and the fact that there are gray areas--

Zahariadis: --becomes a zero sum game. That is your loss is my gain and each country is involved in that kind of antagonism. Which is of course very dangerous. Now let me, having said what the essence, I believe the essence is, let me look at some of the images. What are the images that each country has of the other? A lot of the presenters have talked about them. I want to summarize them into metaphors.

What is the image of Greece of Turkey? Needless to say, these are my own and nobody else's. The Greeks think of the Turks as the insatiable wolf. That is you give them an inch and they'll take a mile. And there is considerable fear behind how the Turks will react and what will they do and what our response will be. Partly because there is no Greek that doesn't know that Turkey does have a preponderance in terms of military capabilities.

What is the image of Turkey of Greece? I believe the image is that of a spoiled brat. That is the Turks think of the Greeks as having it too good, as we've given you everything you've ever wanted and you still want more and what you need is a good spanking. And once you get a good spanking, everything will be alright. The underlying concern here is that of envy. Because the Greeks do have more than the Turks. They do walk around Brussels and the EU which the Turks so desperately want. So there is that sort of antagonism there.

What's the image of outsiders of Greece and Turkey? How do outsiders? Both the Americans, I think, and many of the European allies think of it that way, for lack of better term, crazy neighbors. Where we understand what's going on, but what's interesting and important is there is indifference. Most don't care. There's no stake there. And those that do feel very frustrated because they're tried and they have failed. Obviously these are not new issues.

So having talked about Greek-Turkish relations in those terms and assuming that there are deteriorating conditions, that is we're getting from bad to worse, what do we do? The essence of stabilization, that is to stabilize the situation, is, in my opinion, can consist of four different strategies, and I'll talk to you very briefly, four different elements. What's the objective? The objective is risk aversion. And I would emphasize cost. That is emphasize the cost of deteriorating conditions.

The idea behind this comes from psychology and there is a venerable literature in psychology that says that when you frame problems or situations in terms of cost, people are far less willing to risk what they have than they otherwise would. So if that is indeed the case, the focus I believe ought to be on internal changes. There is very little externally that should be done. Internal meaning Greece and Turkey internally. What are the strategies? I've got several. Let me talk to you very briefly. The Poupoulis(sp?)-Yilmaz measures, I think, you know, more information, I think all that stuff is good. But it ought to be though only one sliver of the entire package of conditions and strategies that need to change.

The first one is, in my opinion, the most important. A healthy national public discourse in each of these countries. What so far happens in each of these countries is sloganeering, they are the enemy and we give them all they want and they want more, etc., etc. But nobody talks about the issues and the issues ar how much does it cost us to go, cost the Greeks and the Turks, to have such deteriorating conditions.

Let me give you some examples just to frame it in the appropriate terms. Turkey. It spends annually $6.6 billion on military expenditures. That's 4% of GNP, that's 17.6% of government budget or $108 per person. Military expenditures are one-third less than education expenditures, but three times more, the Turks spend three times more on their military than they do on their health and on their welfare. That's how much they forego. Turkey plans to spend $150 billion for armaments in the next ten months. To frame it in terms of costs, each year this amounts to a loss of $223 per person or 8% of per capita income.

They're foregoing 8% of their per capita income to do this. A little less than half of their annual central government expenditures. Half of their government expenditures is gone to this military expenditures. 12 times, this is 12 times higher than its spending on health and welfare and two and a half times more than education. Just to put it into perspective, in one year, Turkey will spend almost the same, that is minus $2 billion, as the entire five year Greek armaments program. And that tells you a little bit about what Greeks feel and how and why they feel that way. Just to briefly talk about this.

Greece. It spends almost 5.1 billion annually on defense expenditures. That's 5.5%, a staggering amount of GNP, on defense. 10.8% of its government budget or a whopping $482 per person goes for armaments, bullets, and everything else that's associated with military expenditures. The military expenditures are one-fifth more than education expenditures. Greece spends more on its military than on its education. Understand the logic and the priorities here. One-fourth more than health and one-third less than welfare. And to put it into proper perspective, the plans to spend $17 billion dollars in the next five years in armaments amount to each year a loss.

What does Greece forego? $324.5 per person it forgoes on these armaments. These additional armaments that it will buy. Or 3.7% of per capita income goes down because of it. That's 17.2% of its annual central government expenditures. Slightly more than it's spending on health or on education and almost 50% less than welfare. So having talked about costs, I think that puts it into perspective on what is to be lost if we continue in that direction.

I think the second strategy ought to be production and dissemination of information. And all of this stuff needs to be talked about in the national press, in meetings, in this meeting, in other meetings as well. Because the interest is, one, to dispel stereotypes and unfortunately many they are. And number two, to stress several paradoxes that exist between Greece and Turkey. For example, Turkey by insisting on the whole idea of the muftis, who are the religious leaders that, whether they are elected or appointed as the Greeks want in Western Thrace among the Muslim population in Greece, it's very interesting that Turkey is stressing on an institution that it does not give to its own citizens.

So what can outsiders do? Consistent on the idea of stressing on costs, I think outsiders can first offer sticks, then the carrots. What's the stick? In terms of the EU, curtail the Customs Union vis-a-vis Turkey. Not prospective membership. Even the Customs Union needs to be curtailed in order for Turkey to understand that there are costs associated with what it does and what these costs are. And therefore, that will make things far, far more simple and easier for the Turks to understand what their priorities ought to be if indeed the European Union does think that their priorities ought to be in lessening of tension and more human rights, etc. There definitely needs to be closer supervision of Greece because certainly the Greeks haven't been angels in this whole affair either.

In terms of what the U.S. can do, I think a strong condemnation of undemocratic practices is the very least and that has not been forthcoming or as strong as it should have been. What about the actors? Who should be involved and what needs to be done? I think in this particular situation, the stakes are too high to be left to the politicians. So I believe a bottom up approach is far better. What do I mean by bottom up? Stress and organize civil society associations. Unions, businesses, foundations, the media. They are the ones that should have the incentives to promote a healthy national public discourse rather than the politicians who absolutely don't because they have all sorts of other incentives.

I think the outside governments have a lot to do in this particular situation, but not as much as civil society. Finally, the domestic politicians, who I think do not have the incentive to do much about it or their hands are tied because of partisan politics and the like.

So once we assume that there is stabilization, how do we improve the situation once we have stopped the insanity, so to speak? The objective here is cooperative behavior and emphasizing benefits. Once we've emphasized the costs, switch, start framing in terms of benefits. The focus ought to be again on internal changes because I think they are the most important. But now we're starting to see more external changes. That is cooperative agreements between the two countries.

What are the strategies? The key is democratization. More democracy is good, less democracy is bad. No matter how you slice this pie, democracy is the key. Outsider carrots as opposed to the sticks that they offer. Prospective EU membership. I think Turkey should be part of the EU and I think the Greek government has suggested that. And definitely I think once there is improvement, I think this carrot would go a long way toward giving incentives for more cooperation. More aid, more foreign investment. I think all of that can be done by outsiders.

Finally, between the Greeks and the Turks, I think signing cooperative agreements on energy, on telecommunications, on tourism. There are some. There need to be a heck of a lot more. There is so much more that can be done. Who are the actors up here? Who should we be looking for? I think there are parallel tracks here. On the one hand, there should be civil society associations. Again, those unionists, those individuals that care and want better relations. I think they are the key. Concurrently, however, here the domestic politicians of each country can play a role. And they can take part of the lead in signing those cooperative agreements.

A civil society can only go so far. There much be political will behind it and I think this is the time to do it. And the outsiders I think can do even less in this case, but they obviously have some carrots to offer.

So overall recommendations. There is something that you guys need to come out, to leave with, from my presentation at least. Is number one, the ad hoc issue approach will not work. Coming up with laundry lists of issues and differences and all that stuff will not work because once you solve one, there are two or three or four more that are created or still exist. Number two, democratization is the key to cooperation. That's the number one priority. More democracy in Turkey as well as in Greece is I believe much better for everybody. Greece should take the first step in this direction for the simple reason that he who has most stands to lose the most.

And finally, and I want to echo Ambassador Stearns in this, outsiders have only a limited role to play and all of this needs to be done by initiatives from within, not from without. Thank you. I have all of this information on handouts. So I'll be happy to give them to interested individuals. What I would like to do know, since I'm sure there are quite a few questions that you may wish to ask, I would like to take questions. But we will do it in a specific way. And the specific way is as follows. I'll open the floor to approximately five questions. And please, when you ask questions, identify the speaker to whom you are addressing them, and then I will ask the others to comment as well. I'll take the five questions. Then we will begin the answers. (Housekeeping) So the floor is open to questions. Yes, sir.

Q: I'd like Mr. Bahcheli and Mr. Gordon because I believe you dealt with the EU on Cyprus. Greece is not really involved in Cyprus in many ways, but the EU is. For example, the EU wants a presence on Cyprus. The English have, the French want it, the Germans, the Spanish, they want that presence on Cyprus the way the English have it. The English have it on Cyprus by being there in a commercial way in large numbers, it connects them to the Arab countries and even to Australia.

Now the Greeks don't care about that in Athens, but they know it's very important that the EU have a presence on Cyprus and Cypriots want to be part of Europe because they are European people. They are not a Muslim people. And that goes to the other issue of the Germans not wanting the Turks. Seeing them as giving them borders to Iran. You have Pakistan, Iran, that's the northern fear(?). The Germans are more likely to want the Poles in Europe, not the Turks. But they also want to be involved on Cyprus as a European country.

So I think there's not only a clash between the Turks and the Greeks on Cyprus, there's really a clash between the Europeans and the Greeks and the Turks on the other side on Cyprus.

Zahariadis: Thank you. I would like to ask the audience to limit their questions to no more than three sentences, please, and do include an interrogative statement.

Q: I did.

Zahariadis: I know. I know. I'm not suggesting anything about you. Yes, you did. (simultaneous conversation)

Q: Draconian measures. Two questions--

Q: Excuse me. I didn't get my answer.

M: They will be done. Yes, it will be done as I said it shall be. Thank you.

Q: Question in the room for Van Coufoudakis. In the policy of deterrence, as you mentioned, many people have suggested that a policy of engagement of Turkey is needed. And this was not ...(inaudible) when Greece refused to have dialogue till up to ...(inaudible) So what would you say on this? How is this feasible? What is the ...(inaudible) sense of policy of engagement that would couple, not defeat, but would couple the policy of detente that you so much propagated?

The second thing is you talk about CBMs. On the part of Greece and many Greeks, the best CBM is if the dispute in the Aegean is gone on the soft(?) within(?) all outside international legality. This has caused them to ...(inaudible) No matter how many CBMs you have, information--

__: Confidence building measures. Not everyone knows the acronym.

Q: Confidence building measures. And I'm not referring to Cyprus. Cyprus is a political problem, there has been a political dialogue there since 1968(?). But I think the Aegean problem, which is from the Greek point of view a legal dispute, from the Turkish point of view a political legal issue. And there the best Greeks are very reluctant to proceed with the CBMs and they think that the best CBM is a declaration of renunciation of the use of force. And no matter how many other CBMs you have from ...(inaudible) and everybody else, if you don't have such a basis, you don't have confidence.

M: And the question is?

Q: And the question is, in all the CBMs that you-- The fox problem. There is not a fox problem from the Greek point of view. From the Greek point of view, there is one issue. International legality or not. It's not like you have negotiations.

M: Fox. Okay. Thank you very much. So is there a legality on this issue. That's the question.

Berktay: Mr. Chairman. First, I'm a bit taken aback by your insistence on-- I should introduce myself. I'm Halil Berktay. I'm a panelist in the second round. Frankly, as a participant in this symposium, in everything, every communication that we received from you beforehand, there was an emphasis on extending the discussion and comments as long as possible. Limiting the individual contributions so that we could have ample discussion.

M: You're absolutely right.

Berktay: It is disheartening to be so abruptly reminded that questions should be limited to no more than three sentences. I mean, I think you could do more with a lot more discussion.

M: You should complain to the participants. I'm sorry.

Berktay: I have two things to say. First about Imia-Kardak, the Kardak crisis. As a Turkish citizen, I happened to be in Turkey at the time and lived through that entire, how should I say, the post-modernist messiness of it. The post-modern messiness of Kardak. And I have a very, very different perception of this from the ones presented here as perhaps, you know, a coolly calculated step forward as part of the overall drive of the Turkish military towards expansionism in the Aegean. I should say, just to clarify one thing from the outset, that for all I know, I am perfectly willing to believe that Kardak is legally, in terms of international law, Greek territory. I'm perfectly willing to concede that.

But at the same time, it happens to be just about as long from offshore both from both ...(inaudible) and Naxos(sp?). Just about.

M: It's three and a half.

Berktay: I mean I swam there actually. I swam there in fact. But it seems to me that what's happened was, first, a local Greek mayor on one of the islands went with his entourage to Kardak and hoisted the Greek flag. And then the equivalent, the Turkish equivalent of the Hearst papers of the early 20th century, to be notorious for its chauvinism on all Greek questions, they happened to have a reporter flying over the area in a helicopter and he promptly descended and removed the Greek flag and planted a Turkish flag. And lo and behold, there was a crisis because this was escalated by the nationalist media on both sides.

And then in came Tansu Ciller, who was Prime Minister at the time and in a very, very difficult position, and she decided to make a macho move out of this to sort of further her political career. And that was what happens. I mean, the military were in fact bullied and manipulated by Tansu Ciller into landing a group of commandos on the adjacent island so that Ms. Ciller should make political capital out of it.

Now this doesn't exactly jibe with, you know, the picture of a cool, calculated monoblock raised by Turkish establishment, moving step by step forward, etc. I mean, my view is completely different. I stress this because it abstracts from the extent to which the political establishments in both countries, etc. are in fact prisoners of the media, prisoners of nationalist rhetorics, prisoners of chauvinists and on that ...(inaudible) is much more misevent(?).

M: Okay, is that a question? Yes? One question. I have to ask you, if you have a question, please ask it.

Berktay: This is not a question, it's a comment.

M: I understand, I understand. Actually I fully share your comments. However, I would like to focus on questions here. If you have a question to ask of one of the participants, I would like... Please, please.

Berktay: I have a question of Professor Van Coufoudakis. I am disheartened because it seemed to me that your presentation ran mostly in terms of angels and demons. I mean, it was in effect a kind of posish(?) statement from the Greek side and manifesto from the--

Coufoudakis: My task was to speak of the Greek perspective.

Berktay: Task aside, but I'd just like to point out one thing. You start your abstract and you started your paper with the remarks that 74 years after Lausanne and 75 years after the destruction of Smyrna and the expulsion of the Greeks from Asia Minor. Now obviously the years 1908-1923, including the Balkan Wars and Gallipoli and World War I and the landing of the Greek Expeditionary Army, Anatolia, such an enormous intersection of traumatic experiences for all the nations of the Balkans. I mean, there could be different ways of talking about this. What I'm trying to stress is different ways of talking about these traumas.

What you say, the expressions that you have chosen, one sided and unilaterally refer to traumas inflicted by the Turks on the others. Why not generalize and refer to the traumas of those years? Or if you are going to cite individual events and give dates, why not say 80 odd years after the Greek population of Constantinople celebrated the Turkish army's rout in the Balkan Wars and 80 years or so after Greeks proposed to bring Britain to man the Greek army in Gallipoli, to liberate Gallipoli for the Allies? Or why not say 76 or more years after the landing of the Greek Expeditionary Army in Asia Minor? And so many years after the collapse of the Greek ...(inaudible)

I say this not in order to suggest that-- A Turkish nationalist will tap into the ...(inaudible) That's what I mean to say. But surely, in referring to those painful memories, you can find a different way about talking of the traumas and the victimization narratives on both sides.

M: Thank you. And this is the final one.

Prodromou: Yeah, I have a question for Dr. Gordon. First I just wanted to congratulate you on sizing something that I think is paid too little attention, namely the divergence between Brussels and Washington's policies in the region. And I wanted to ask two specific questions with regards to this divergence between Brussels and Washington vis-a-vis Greece and Turkey and Cyprus in particular. If we accept that the European Union took a calculated bluff in making the quid pro quo for Greece with beginning the accession talks for Cyprus, what's your reading in terms of the American subtext on all this? Were the Americans on board for this? And if so, how did they interpret possible three scenarios that you discussed?

And secondly, might not a true Machiavellian real politick person argue that in fact - I forget which scenario it was that you cited - that only the Republic of Cyprus is included in the European Union and the north is annexed by Turkey, shrewd Euro real politikers will in fact have achieved their goal. They will have found precisely the rationale for permanently excluding Turkey from the European Union.

M: Alright, thank you. What I would like to do is now lump all those questions together and we'll start with the questions thematically on the whole Cyprus issue and is it a clash between the Europeans and the Greeks and the Turks?

Coufoudakis: I'll just take a crack at the first question. The European credentials of Cyprus is recognized by the EU members, by the way, ever since the EU and Cyprus signed a customs trade agreement in 1972, there was a subtext there that at some point Cyprus could apply to join, to become a full member. Now those countries that you have cited as having a stake, like the U.K., in having a presence in Cyprus, I don't think really they have that much of a stake. Even as they recognize the European credentials of Cypriots, both Greek and Turkish. And I would emphasize, as Mr. Gordon has, the anxiety that many of them have importing this problem into the EU. Why should they? Well, you know, what is the payoff for them? What is the payoff for France, you know, for Portugal, for whatever to have Cyprus in the EU?

Now there is sympathy in the EU even without Greece pushing the membership of the Republic of Cyprus. I think there is sympathy in particular for the Greek Cypriots. Are you going to let me finish or are you stopping me? Well, okay. I'll stop there.

M: I'm not saying. I'm letting you speak.

Coufoudakis: Okay. Well, as you were just gesticulating, I'm just wondering whether you want me to stop or not.

M: No, no, go ahead. So then I can show you wrong. (Laughter)

Coufoudakis: I'll leave it at that actually.

__: Just because they're Europeans and the Europeans want them in Europe, they don't want Turks because they're Muslims. The Europeans would rather have the Poles in Europe, but not the Turks. They want the Cypriots in Europe. The English are trying to prevent the other Europeans from being in Cyprus. The French want to be in Cyprus, the Germans, the Italians, the Spanish, the head of NATO.

M: Okay, thank you very much.

Gordon: That question was also put to me, but I'll try to be very brief. I don't know really what you mean by saying all the others want to be on Cyprus. I mean, it's clear that the British have a military presence on Cyprus which they value and have always valued their role in the Mediterranean and see themselves through that light as a Mediterranean power. I don't think even the French who we all know do have ambitions to be a global Mediterranean, Middle Eastern power, I don't think even the French think about Cyprus as a foothold where they could somehow get their hands on it or get their military forces on it.

Even if Cyprus were to join the European Union, there is no discussion or possibility that suddenly British bases on Cyprus would become EU bases on Cyprus. I think the French know that and don't have any allusions that somehow this could lead to their military presence there. The other countries in the EU don't even think about these issues in that light. I would venture to say that the Germans and others have not once thought about Cyprus as a means toward a foothold in the Mediterranean.

I thought Elizabeth Prodromou's questions were very good. I wish I had better answers. I mean, was the U.S. on board for this? I honestly have to say I don't know. And I'll tell you what I think, but maybe someone else here actually knows. I think the U.S. wasn't paying such close attention to the details of what was going on here. Somebody told the U.S. that this would lead to a Customs Union with Turkey and that was a very high U.S. priority and so, you know, it sounds like a good thing. So you'll have some accession negotiations with EU. These details don't interest us. What does interest us is that you are now going to be able to move ahead with EU enlargement which we fervently support. You're now going to have a Customer Union which we fervently support.

And whether someone wrote an internal memo that said, "Hey, look ahead. There might be some problems here for the EU in the future," I don't know if that memo was written and I don't know what the reaction would have been, but it would have been, I suppose, you know, that's the EU problem. Again, maybe someone here actually knows precisely more than that. But that's what that seems to me to be the case.

On your second point, also very interesting because I did describe this third scenario whereby only the Republic of Cyprus joins and then there's partition of the north. I think the tone of the way I said it was a sort of very bad news and so on. But I think you're right to suggest that for some people at least, it's not bad. You know, this takes care of the problem, provides the pretext what we'd like to do anyway or what frankly has been done anyway, and that could be a basis for moving ahead. Personally, I actually think there's something to that and have been interested in the idea of partition as a basis for peace and stabilizing the situation.

But I would flag the obvious problem with it. It could at the same time, whereas it reassures those who want to make partition a permanent feature, it could also encourage those on Cyprus and in Greece who think that EU membership is now the backing that they've longed for and never had. And if the Greek Cypriots, backed by Greece, saw this not as, okay, now partition has taken place, we can get on with other business but rather as now we've got the EU behind us and surely Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots can't afford a conflict with the EU. Then the situation is less stable. And that's what I would worry about if that scenario were to come about.

Coufoudakis(?): Now first of all, Dimitris, you asked about deterrence versus engagement. I have always been an advocate of the fact that Greece should not veto the association, I mean the Customs Union of Turkey to the European Union. Because it provided a very convenient excuse to the other Europeans to hide behind the Greek veto and not display their actual policy, particularly in the case of Germany, for not wanting the Turks in any kind of close contact with the European Union. So in December of '95, the Greek government did a very appropriate move, lifting the objections and setting it in the framework of when Turkey's able to meet the membership criteria of the European Union, then that process can take place. That was a very positive action that took place in 1995.

You can't forget that despite the confrontation elements, there is a great deal going on at the informal lower level, including the formal level. Black Sea cooperation, for example. It's a massive undertaking. Greece and Turkey, despite their other political differences, have not had any difficulty cooperating with Black Sea trade. Look at the kind of trade differential between Greece and Turkey in terms of what Greece imports from Turkey every year. And Greek exports to Turkey are minimal in that sense. At the same time, tourism falls in the same category. There is a lot more that can be done. I'm sure between the universities, cultural exchanges, all those kinds of things and they are taking more and more, they're taking place more and more in recent years. Particularly in the last five years.

And the business community has taken a number of initiatives. Mr. Kach(sp?) from the Turkish side particularly. Major Greek businessmen have done the same thing. They've met in Europe, they've met in Greece. So there is a lot going on. But confrontation or deterrence occurs on issues that affect vital strategic areas and that's not going to away. Now, again, I keep coming back because Professor Berktay raised the issue of my policy, so-called statement. The title for my presentation was handed to me. Therefore, I wrote the paper on the basis of what I was asked to talk about.

Now there is no doubt, and I agree with you, that in the case of the Imia crisis in December of '95, January of '96, things happened because other parties, nationalist, extremist types got involved. Television. Helicopters flying, planting flags and things like that. Eventually both sides ended up mobilizing because, like as you said, Madame Ciller attempted to save her political career by embarking on the enterprise she did in this particular case. At the same time though, my concern about the so-called calculated policy comes in that after Mrs. Ciller left the government, the Turkish government coming out and saying we have no territorial claims, we do recognize the status quo.

What did we have in turn? We had suddenly the proclamation of the so-called gray areas that extend not only in the depths of the Aegean, but as far as the island of Rothos(?), which is closer to Libya. I'm sorry. It's south of Crete. Libya perhaps may have a claim on Rothos for heaven's sakes, but not Turkey. Now if you live in Athens and you look at these things from a Greek perspective, that is important. Now you talk to me about why did I use 74 years after Lausanne, 75 years after the events in Smyrna. These are spectacular events in the bilateral relationship of the two countries. I don't see how and why you're challenging me on Lausanne.

1923, the Lausanne Treaty was the beginning of Greco-Turkish detente. This is what set the new foundation of the coexistence of the two states. You should praise me for talking about the Lausanne Treaty rather than criticize me for that. As for the 1922 events, they did take place, they had a major impact on the Greek psyche. You cannot erase that anyway you look at it. Now I will stop here.

Stearns: I think Mr. Gordon is absolutely right in his answer to Elizabeth's question on whether the United States was consciously aboard on the decision, on the Customs Union. For Washington, any action which would bring Turkey closer to Western Europe was its own justification. And I doubt very much, knowing how Washington works, that much worry was expended on the question of what would happen when the Cyprus accession talks began. The bird in the hand was the Customs Union for Turkey. And of course this does raise the question which this group ought to address or consider and that is are we looking at the final solution of the Cyprus problem.

Because I think Elizabeth again was right in saying that it's very likely that the Republic of Cyprus will be brought into the European Union without the north. And the north will therefore be incorporated by Turkey. And clearly the only result will be to extend the troubled Greek-Turkish frontier another five or six hundred miles. So that we're facing some difficult problems ahead.

M: Thank you. We have time for two more questions. Yes, sir.

Q: I will make it really brief. It's to Professor Coufoudakis and the rest of the panel. To what extent would you say that the crisis that has escalated in the last couple of years between Greece and Turkey is due to post-Dayton realizations by both countries, especially Greece, that although Greece says that it wants an answer within judicial parameters, Greece realizes that Dayton places now a political urgency. So Greece has raised the stakes by saying the S300s. Maybe Greece and Cyprus will never be solved. But this is just an escalation of negotiation. You have something to negotiate from.

And I would like to bring your attention to 1992, in which the Turkish government negotiated with the violations of the Greek air space to lift a veto for Mediterranean funds. So in a sense, Greece is taking a page out of the Turkish foreign policy play book, if you wish. The second point that I want to make is to Professor Zahariadis. You spoke of this elusive, now chic civil society. How do you create civil society? How long does civil society take?

There was a Christina Koulouris(sp?) who wrote in the 1980s in Greece and she did a comparative study of what Greek children were being taught in the early 1800s of the Turk who was friendly, of the Turk who was peace loving, so on and so forth. And the children in the 1900s in Greece were learning that the Turk was a rapist, was somebody who didn't care for peace, so on and so forth. So, you know, this is a process that takes place in a long time.

M: Thank you. Yes, sir.

Q: I would like to ask a brief question of you, sir. I noticed you said, I think I got it correctly, that an ad hoc approach will not work. I thought I understood from Monty Stearns and the others that an overall approach wouldn't work. How ad hoc is an ad hoc approach? Most of your comments, which I thought were strikingly innovative, seemed to me to be ad hocery.

M: Thank you. Oh, yes, yeah. And this is it. This is the last one.

Q: My name is Merk Lusiotome(sp?), the Ambassador of Cyprus is ...(inaudible) of his and I was very struck with equally ...(inaudible) the very time, I use that term that Professor Gordon chose, naive presentation of the EU side for accession, whole issue. I think maybe because of limitations, I argue(?) that. But I think you emphasized and you concentrated on the negative reaction by Turkey to this process. Turkey knew that Cyprus at some point is going to be divided for a long time. And already benefitted from that being invited to have the Customs Union.

But I think the EU process should be seen in this dynamic, in this potential positive dynamic that it has for everybody. And to charge that all these nations in the EU are so naive, they didn't think of the consequences or the State department in Washington, they didn't think and nobody sent out any memo to warn them. I think really, really naive. What the United States did in the crisis of Cyprus, they rest(?) their position as Ambassador Stearns knows.

The U.S. used to oppose Cyprus' application to the EU before the solution of the Cyprus problem. And under Mr. Holbrook and others, when he was assistant secretary of state for European affairs, they probably thought we have tried just about everything else. The common denominator in this region, in these three countries is the EU. Greece is a member, Cyprus is on its way, and Turkey wishes to be a member. Why not use this process as a positive catalyst and try this? Nobody said it's going to be easy. I mean, the Cyprus problem in itself, you keep saying, if you read the speeches of President Clerides, everybody. Nobody promised an easy accession road.

But they chose to stress and emphasize the positive dynamic out of this process rather than the negative. And let me say also I think it's rather insulting to Turkish Cypriots themselves to be saying that it's only economically we will benefit. I don't think the EU offers only economic benefits. And if you examine it very seriously and not just take only the reactions from Ankara, I think the Turkish Cypriots are being, you know, deprived of a great opportunity. Here is Turkey, wants to become a member of the EU, saying that they support and they are going to fight for the interests of the Turkish Cypriots. But they are denying the Turkish Cypriot community the chance to become Europeans and hold a European password, perhaps renewed for five years.

And I also wanted to say two more things. The Republic of Cyprus is the whole ...(inaudible) on Cyprus less the pre-...(inaudible) basis and the European Union invited the whole of Cyprus, the Republic of Cyprus as a whole to join. So the government negotiates for the whole of Cyprus. And in part it has offered formulas to reach the Turkish Cypriot community, even now with the division, can participate in the negotiations.

M: Thank you.

Nicolaidis: Kalypso Nicolaidis. Actually I think the last remarks very well illustrates Tozun Bahcheli's point that there may be sincere, but very misguided assessments of each other's interests and perception from the other side. And it was a perfect demonstration and it gets to my question because I don't want to see this panel close without really having to address each other's points. I mean, you know, you've all made rather provocative statements to each other and I'm not hearing responses. I'm hearing responses from the room. And since Philip Gordon did challenge the rest of you to address this question on the Cypriot question. And if I may, reframe it somewhat.

I mean, when we look at stalled negotiations like this, one of the major reasons that we hear why they're stalled is that each side tends to exaggerate how bad the no deal case is for the other side. So the Greeks exaggerate how bad, that's what we just heard, how bad this would be the Cypriot side and therefore they should be willing to make compromise and vice versa. And that's one of the reasons why negotiations stalled. Therefore, if you hope, naively maybe, but that there might be a compromise, part of this is to influence each other's perception about the reality of the no deal and it's not so bad. And if each side understands that no deal's not so bad, then they might be more willing to make compromises.

So in the Cypriot case, I would like to hear you again on how, both from your viewpoint, I guess, Turkish and Greek, but maybe with U.S. and you come back into this, how you perceive the extent to which this can be corrected, this perception of really how costly no deal is for the other side. And if you can persuade the other side, then you might make one step towards persuading them to make compromises in the final packet.

M: Thank you. Lots to talk about, I guess. Let's start with the last one since this seems to be more appropriate and then we'll go backwards.

Gordon: Okay. On naivete. What I said was naive was the idea held by some in the European Union that if Cyprus were offered accession negotiation, this would galvanize the Turkish Cypriots and the Turks to reach an agreement on the island that would allow this to happen. The word naive seems to me to define something that you hope for, but is very far from being the case. Everything I've seen so far in this situation suggests that it was naive to believe this would happen. I could be wrong. I hope sincerely that I am wrong. Nothing would delight me more than to see Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots reach a solution on the island. And Turks in Turkey agree that it would be okay for Cyprus to join the EU without Turkey.

If all of that were to happen, I would be very happy to come back and say my analysis was wrong. However, everything I've seen so far, the talks in New York and in Geneva and the Holbrook visit and so on, unfortunately leads me to believe that this was right. That it's not going to happen. I think it is true that it wasn't just the EU that was mistaken in this analysis or that may well have been mistaken. I don't know. Again, I hope this works out. The U.S. too, I think you're right, the gentleman who posed the question. I think Holbrook and Grossman also came to that view that, hell, it's worth a try. In fact I know they came to that view.

They looked at the options, they needed to try something. They were unable to push for partition because the U.S. Congress would never have it. I mean, as keen as they are on reassuring Turkey and the strategic interest the U.S. has in Turkey, they realize that actually to try to reassure Turkey by taking a Turkish position on this would backfire because we wouldn't support partition, the Congress would then impose sanctions on Turkey and we'd be in a big mess with Turkey. So in that context, they said we don't have a lot of choice. What the hell, maybe it will work, let's give it a try. I again though come back to my own analysis, which is that this try won't work and I think we'll find that out in the coming year. (simultaneous conversation)

No, you just ...(inaudible) Kalypso's point which, I'm sorry, I think that's a very interesting perspective, exaggerating how bad no deal is. And I think it describes the case for the Turkish Cypriots and the reasons why I gave the analysis that I just did. I just don't think that the Turkish Cypriots are sitting there thinking, "Boy, if there's a partition and we have to integrate with Turkey, we just can't do that." I mean, on the contrary, I think they're sitting there thinking, "No deal? Oh, it's alright. That will be fine. At least, you know, that will make one step closer to permanent the situation that we find not too uncomfortable at present."

Bahcheli(?): Kalypso, you made some excellent points there. I've tried to conduct research on particularly the Turkish Cypriot views about EU membership. I don't want to claim that I've done any exhaustive, comprehensive research, but I've been twice to the Tyrrhenian Sea in the last couple of years and have taken opportunities to ask as many people as I can engage about the EU. The first point I'd make is that not very many people know very much about the EU. And what they know about the EU is so, how shall I put it, is so negative. I mean, the EU is the institution that has rejected Turkey's membership back in 1990. The EU is biased against Turkey and the EU has, even though it has had a prior application from the Turks, is now poised to accept puny little Greek Cyprus and so on. So, you know, there is that.

Now the Turkey Cypriot society is no monolith anymore than the Greek Cypriot society is a monolith. There is actually some interest, some economic interest in the Turkish community. I think that has to be said. The economy is hurting in North Cyprus. And there are two parties that are actually keen on EU membership. But overall, I would say that there is no anxiety in--

Coufoudakis: I would agree with Tozun that one of the obstacles regarding the European Union is a lack of knowledge among many of the prospective members of what the EU is all about and what it does mean to be a member of the EU. I know that on occasion the European Union has made an attempt to conduct seminars in the northern part of Cyprus and I don't think they have gotten very far with some of that discussion. But quite often the discussion of the EU is framed in generalities rather than on specifics and of course the issue of democratization in addition to the cultural benefits, the economic benefits and so on are very important points that people tend to forget.

Also part of the lack of knowledge is the fact that they do not understand, one, that what it takes to be a member of the European Union, meaning the membership criteria, and therefore we can have generalizations. Well, they're anti-Turkish, they're hostile to Turkey by not accepting them as members. While they don't understand that the European Union is a union of countries that are democratic in character, that have certain economic levels of performance and things like that that Turkey to date has not met. So the lack of knowledge is manipulated in the political arena and I think we're at the kind of deadlock we're in today.

Stearns: One other point, we shouldn't forget that North Cyprus is pretty well integrated economically already into Turkey. I've had lunch in Kyrenia a year ago and, as I remember, my luncheon bill denominated in Turkish lire was the better part of a million Turkish lire. And the benefits, if there are benefits in the future for the Turkish Cypriots for membership in the EU, are going to require an awful lot of selling because while the situation from a statistical point in northern Cyprus is impoverished, people have adapted to it and they will require much more knowledge and first hand experience before they're convinced that they will benefit from EU membership.

Bahcheli(?): ...(inaudible) the one final element I can add to that is also the demographic change occurring in the North today. Particularly the new elements being brought in that are changing so drastically the make up, the demographic make up of the North. Have not only the impact of lack of knowledge, but they increase the European fears that a united Cyprus may become the venue through which the Turks are going to find their way into the European Union. Meaning the workers and others. They cannot get in directly, but they can go through Cyprus. Particularly if the other political settlement has not been cleared. And that is something that very few people are paying attention to.

M: Thank you. Just a quick note and it says my prerogative as the chair and since two questions were addressed to me. One, how do we create civil society? You're looking at it. Hopefully there will be more. That needs to be done in this way. The second one is the is this an ad hoc issue approach and does it work? No, it will not work. Is my approach ad hoc? No, it has coherence, it has purpose, and it has sequence and I'll be happy to explain that more after the break. Now we have a coffee break. Thank you very much for attending this and you can raise more questions of the panelists, can be addressed outside. Thank you.

END