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File: 9506-7
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE. A PLETHORA OF ORGANIZATIONS?
Anne-Else Hojberg, NATO's Political Affairs Division
The challenge of creating a system of mutually
reinforcing institutions in the realm of European
security is compounded by the number of organizations
addressing security, and confusion as to their
respective roles. Enhancing practical cooperation
and reducing any rivalry between these organizations
is essential. This article describes the background
for the interaction between the various institutions
engaged in European security and, while not
attempting to cover the full range of actual contacts
or goals which they pursue, offers some thoughts on
what is required to achieve a cooperative European
security structure.
The most common question asked concerning the European
security order is why is it necessary to have so many
institutions? Is it not an obstacle to efficient crisis
management in Europe? Does it not produce an unnecessary
overlapping and unreliable division of responsibility?
Considered from the perspective of crisis resolution it
would undoubtedly be more practical if there were fewer
institutions addressing this issue. The conflict in
former Yugoslavia has shown how difficult it can be for
various international institutions to function together
effectively.
It is important to recognise that the institutions in
question have functions beyond handling open conflicts -
it is just as important that they help prevent conflicts
from breaking out in the first place. In other words,
they must create a framework for the reciprocal balancing
and reconciling of often divergent interests. While most
successful institutions have developed internal
mechanisms to minimize potential divisiveness,
channelling divergences towards compromise and common
purpose, there is no such mechanism performing this
crucial role between institutions.
This makes it that much more important, therefore, to
maintain the effort to turn the potential for mutual
institutional reinforcement in the security realm into
actual, functioning cooperation. To do so requires, as a
first step, a clear understanding of the aims and
objectives of the institutions that address issues of
relevance to European security (the UN, the OSCE, the
Council of Europe, the EU, the WEU and NATO - see
diagram). It is also important to understand the changes
these institutions have undergone thanks to the end of
the Cold War, and the main challenges they face today in
their interaction.
The United Nations
The United Nations was established in 1945, at the end of
the Second World War, with the primary purpose of
avoiding a Third World War. It represents nearly all the
nations of the world community in terms of its membership
and its purview. For five decades, the UN has assumed
broad responsibilities in the fields of security,
socio-economic affairs, culture, humanitarian issues, and
so on. During the Cold War, the East-West division
caused a stalemate in the UNunctions in the security
field but when the Cold War ended, the UN, and in
particular the UN Security Council, began to play a more
pronounced role in international security cooperation,
including a widened role in Europe. While in 1990 the UN
had 11,500 peacekeepers in nine operations, this had
increased to 70,000 in 17 operations by 1994.
However, the handling of many new and extended tasks has
not been without difficulty for the UN. Operations in
Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have caused considerable
problems, and the UN was criticised for not being able to
undertake operations in an effective manner.
In comparison with the Cold War era, peacekeeping has
become much more complicated as the security environment
has changed fundamentally. Post-Cold War conflicts are
primarily of an intrastate nature and characterised by
uncontrollable factors such as ethnic strife, religious
clashes, nationalism, etc. Instead of operating between
parties in the classical interstate conflicts of the Cold
War, quite often peacekeepers are now operating in the
middle of a conflict, even in an environment of continued
fighting, such as in the former Yugoslavia. Also, the
financial backing for operations has proved to be
increasingly a problem.
In falling short of both financial resources and
operational capabilities to carry out the requisite task,
the UN has accepted that member countries may wish to
implement Security Council resolutions by acting through
regional structures. Since 1992, the Alliance member
countries have used NATOtructures, procedures, and
military forces to help implement such resolutions.
NATOaritime operations in the Adriatic - enforcing the
embargo/sanctions - and the Allianceir operations in the
former Yugoslavia, are primary examples. NATO also had
to change its policy to be able to respond positively to
requests by the UN. During the Cold War, a political
consensus existed amongst NATO nations that its
structures should not be used beyond the territory of the
member states. The agreement had been made to secure
NATOefensive role and prevent member countries from being
drawn into a proxy war that could lead to a superpower
conflict. Today, NATO is prepared to make its
contribution beyond its territory, but only if it has a
mandate from the UN or the OSCE.
The present cooperation between the UN and NATO reflects
the nature of the changed security environment after the
Cold War. Whilst it lasted, it would have been
impossible to reach agreement in the Security Council to
request NATO involvement in the implementation of a
resolution on the ground. Today, as we have seen in the
former Yugoslavia, this has become attainable.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), formerly known as the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), was initially a political
consultative process, which today involves 53
participating states(1). The CSCE, established in 1975
as a result of the Helsinki Final Act, was a product of
the Cold War in that it was launched with the aim of
providing a confidence-building mechanism to help
overcome the East-West divide.
The OSCE's preventive diplomacy tools have been
considerably strengthened since the end of the Cold War,
beginning with the changes adopted in the Paris Charter
of 1990. In Budapest, in December 1994, the
transformation from a cooperation process to an
organization began. Today, the OSCE has three main
functions, including acting as:
- a framework for the creation of norms in the OSCE
area related to international law, human rights, minority
rights, democracy, the rule of law and a market economy;
- a framework for the process of arms control in
Europe; and
- a framework for early warning, conflict prevention and
conflict resolution supported by confidence-building
mechanisms and the appointment of a High Commissioner for
National Minorities.
The scope of its membership, encompassing all European
states and North America, and its status as a regional
organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, confer
upon the OSCE a unique form of legitimacy. The main
focus of the organization lies in conflict prevention,
not in the settlement of conflicts that have already
broken out. It should therefore, in coordination with
other structures, be able to develop a capacity in the
field of defusing inter-ethnic strife and extreme
nationalistic tendencies, possibly two of the biggest
threats to stability in Europe today. But, the success
of the OSCE finally rests upon the political will of the
member countries to use the full capacity of the
organization, and make up for any deficiencies it may
possess through cooperation with other European
institutions.
The principle of cooperation with other institutions was
agreed at the OSCEelsinki Summit in 1992. This is the
background for NATOepeated offer of assistance,
exemplified by Allied countries stating their readiness
to support, on a case-by-case basis, peacekeeping
activities under the responsibility of the OSCE. NATO has
also contributed to the work of the OSCE in the security
field, particularly in the development of its approach to
conflict prevention and crisis management through
participation in OSCE seminars and other conceptual
inputs.
The Council of Europe
The Council of Europe (CoE) was established in 1949. Its
core functions, which have remained constant since its
inception, are those of upholding the principles of
parliamentary democracy and providing a structure within
which human rights issues can be addressed.
Today, the CoE contributes to overall European security
by helping Central and Eastern European countries to form
stable democracies. The Council of Europe is currently
finalizing a Convention for the Protection of Minority
Rights which will provide other organizations and states
with an internationally agreed set of behavioural
guidelines. This process of m creation necessary so that
standards may be set, providing the means whereby actions
can be objectively assessed and enforced. With the end
of East-West confrontation, many more common fields of
interest now exist between NATO and the CoE. Both
institutions should be able to benefit from each
otherxperience and expertise in situations where
fundamental rights are bound up in the wider context of a
situation which may possibly have a security dimension.
The statutes of the Council of Europe do not permit it to
become involved in defence issues. Therefore, when the
CoE was the first Western democratic institution to widen
its membership to include the new democracies in Central
and Eastern Europe, it was relatively non-controversial.
It is obvious that NATO, in its enlargement process, can
learn from the lessons of the CoE.
The European Union
In 1957, the Treaty of Rome was signed as an economic and
political framework. At the Maastricht Summit in
December 1991, the European Community countries adopted a
Treaty on Political Union, and a Treaty on Economic and
Monetary Union, which together form the Treaty of
European Union (EU). Today, the EU also has a number of
functions of fundamental significance to European
security. Internally, it serves to bind the European
great powers together, and it provides stability through
integration by offering a stable framework for
democracies to develop and prosper. The EU member states
have achieved a degree of integration which makes them
dependent on each other. Externally, it contributes to a
profound stabilisation process in Europe, through its
means and resources - both political and economic - for
example, in the form of the Europe Agreements with
Central and Eastern European countries and the
TACIS/PHARE Programmes, supporting the economic reform
processes in these countries through technical assistance
and aid.
With the adoption of the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, members
of the EU committed themselves to a Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) which will include all questions
related to the security of the Union, including the
eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might,
in time, lead to a common defence compatible with that of
the Atlantic Alliance. The Union would request the WEU
(which is described in the Treaty as an integral part of
the development of the Union) to implement Union
decisions that have a defence element. The CFSP has,
however, had difficulty in launching itself. Noteworthy
positive initiatives on the broader security level have
been the Stability Pactound Tables, which, since March
1995, now come under the responsibility of the OSCE, and
the development of a peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In order to work efficiently both internally and with
other structures, it will be important for the EU, during
its Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) in 1996, to
undertake institutional adjustments so that it is not
weakened by an expansion of its membership. In the
security field, the prospects for agreement on a revision
of the Maastricht Treatyrovisions on the CFSP, including
its extension to comprise a common defence policy, will,
however, remain complicated and depend on an efficient
division of labour with other organizations. NATO views
its own enlargement and that of the EU as mutually
supportive and parallel processes which together will
make a significant contribution to strengthening
Europeecurity structure. While no rigid parallelism is
foreseen, each organization will need to consider
developments in the other.
The Western European Union
The WEU grew out of the Brussels Treaty of 1948, a
Western European initiative aimed at preventing the
resurgence of military threats. Based on the 1954
modifications of its Treaty, the WEU evolved only in the
1980s into a framework aimed at reinforcing the European
defence identity. The WEU is therefore called upon to
have the dual role of enabling the EU to implement
measures taken under its Common Foreign and Security
Policy which have defence implications, while at the same
time, strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance.
The four membership categories of the WEU (see diagram)
reflect this dual role:
- full members are members of both the EU and of NATO;
- associate members are the European members of NATO
which are not members of the EU;
- observers are (except Denmark) traditionally neutral
countries, which are members of the EU, but not of NATO;
and
- associate partners are the countries which have
concluded "Europe Agreements" with the EU, i.e., those
Central and Eastern European Countries expected to become
EU-members.
With the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU became an integral
part of the development of the Union. In its dual role
as defence component of the EU and a strengthening of the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, the WEU brings
an important additional dimension to European security.
At the NATO Summit in 1994, NATO's Heads of State and
Government acknowledged this dual role and contributed to
its further development by expressing readiness to make
collective assets available on the basis of consultations
in the North Atlantic Council for WEU operations
undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their
CFSP.
When implemented, the concept of "Combined Joint Task
Forces" will enable asset-sharing between the WEU and
NATO to take place and allow the maximum possible use of
forces that already exist.
However, the challenge for the WEU will lie in its future
relations with the EU, including which of various models
for closer cooperation it chooses. One possibility is
that the WEU will continue its separate treaty status,
while a more far-reaching model could consist of
incorporating the WEU into a European defence dimension
as the EU's fourth pillar.
Among the arguments for keeping the EU and WEU as
separate institutions is, first of all, the fact that
several EU member countries do not wish to seek full
membership of the WEU. A further argument for retaining
their distinctiveness is that it would make it possible
to admit the Central and East European countries into the
EU without there being any need to extend security
guarantees to them. By contrast, because of the linkage
between the security guarantees of the WEU and NATO, it
is hard to imagine that a country could become a full
member of the WEU without becoming, or already being, a
member of NATO.
NATO
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established in
1949 as a defence organization designed to strengthen
democracy in Europe and collectively safeguard the member
states' territory. The organization was established at a
time of great tension. This is in contrast to the
situation that exists today, where the threat of
Communism has subsided, only to be replaced by an
environment that is largely unpredictable, and where "the
risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in
nature and multidirectional, which makes them hard to
predict and assess." (2)
NATO's significance relies upon the fact that it is both
an important political and military organization, the
latter role resulting from close cooperation through
NATO's integrated military structure. In addition to its
traditional role of defending the territory of the member
states, NATO has taken up new tasks: crisis management,
including peacekeeping, and outreach to countries in
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
In crisis management and peacekeeping, NATO is ready to
respond to requests of the UN or the OSCE on a
case-by-case basis. It is only with such a mandate that
NATO is prepared to act beyond its territory.
Through the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation
Council (NACC) in 1991 and the Partnership for Peace
(PfP) in 1994, NATO is actively building with CEE
countries, the countries of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) and a number of neutral nations,
the familiarity, trust and habits of cooperation which
Allies have developed amongst themselves for many
decades. PfP is much more than a means of preparation
for countries that wish to join NATO. It is a key
element of the new security architecture - closing the
gap between Allies and Partners and providing a unique
framework for contacts among military personnel on a
day-to-day basis. It thus brings countries together in a
nexus of cooperation - enhancing security for the whole
of Europe, and complementing an eventual NATO
enlargement.
Conclusion
In achieving a system of mutually reinforcing
institutions responsible for security in Europe, it is
obvious that adjustment following the end of the Cold War
is a process that must continue. The UN is seeking to
improve implementation of resolutions agreed by the
Security Council; the OSCE is discussing its role in the
21st century; the CoE is enlarging with new democracies,
still aiming at maintaining high standards of human
rights; the EU is seeking a balance between the delicate
compromise of the Maastricht Treaty and further
enlargement to the East; the WEU is enhancing its
operational capacity while discussing its future position
in European security; and NATO is engaged in a process
of enlargement while developing parallel relations with
Russia, and taking developments within the EU and North
America into consideration.
In improving coordination amongst organizations, the
creation of various frameworks and forms of cooperation,
such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and PfP,
whose membership cuts across the traditional
organizations, has proved extremely useful. Still, four
general challenges can be identified in the functioning
of the mutually reinforcing institutions.
First, there is still a certain degree of rivalry between
the different organizations and it is obvious that there
is still some way to go in defining how they are to
interact together. This challenge also extends to the
member countries themselves which are grappling with the
twin problems of seeking to support the institution that
they feel will be the most effective, while ensuring that
their voice can still be clearly heard.
Second, it will be essential to match ideals and
capabilities. Both the UN and the OSCE are able to
legitimise actions but lack the operational and military
structures to implement their decisions. Thus there must
be strong ties between these organizations with the
broader mandates - the UN and OSCE - and those with the
capabilities, for example, NATO or perhaps the WEU.
Third, enhancing practical cooperation between
organizations is essential. For example, the NATO and
WEU Secretariats are working ever closer together and,
although there is little formally structured cooperation
between the UN and NATO, the ad hoc efforts in connection
with the former Yugoslavia have significantly intensified
practical contacts between these two organizations. The
experience gained here will be invaluable in solving
future challenges together.
Finally, there is a major process of adaptation and
enlargement under way in all the organizations in an
attempt to help stabilise the Central and Eastern
European countries within the framework of a broad
European security system. But the changes made in the
individual organizations are complex and it is not always
easy to benefit from the lessons learned.
The different organizations in the emerging European
security architecture were all created with different
agenda and in different situations. Thus work is under
way on adaptation and cooperation amongst the
organizations. NATO, for its part, is actively working
with the UN, the OSCE, the WEU, the EU and individual
countries in finding solutions to the multi-faceted and
multi-directional risks to European security. The
advantages of the different institutions must be
exploited to the full whilst the search for pragmatic
solutions is maintained. Even though the sheer number of
organizations might seem overwhelming, we should not
worry unduly because it is precisely their number that
will ensure that no problem is left unaddressed and no
country need feel excluded.
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