File: 9506-1

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY. HOW TO AVOID MISSING THE 1996 RENDEZ-VOUS

Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission

Although the broad lines of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy, launched two years ago, are heading in the right direction, its implementation is more uncertain. Described in a recent Commission report as not living up to expectations, the CFSP has suffered, among other things, from a lack of political will, difficulties with the decision-making system, and crippling budgetary procedures. A further fundamental problem concerns relations between the European Union and its defence component, the WEU. These teething problems would probably have been easier to tolerate had they not been highlighted by the war in the former Yugoslavia. The author argues that Europe would be taking a serious risk if the Union is not provided with foreign policy and joint defence resources capable of dealing with the current issues.

A European identity is not a simple fact of life. It is based on the intuitive certainty of a joint destiny, but it is also the creation of a slow process of diplomatic negotiation. Jean Monnet, the father of the European Community, said, "What we are creating is not an alliance between states but a union between people,"words which clearly express this ultimate purpose of European integration: to construct a European design on a feeling of belonging to a genuine community.

It is upon this feeling that the permanence of the structure depends, because it is the basis of people's willingness to stand together against the dangers which might threaten them. As a revealing indicator of the extent to which this process has advanced, a "common defence" and "common foreign policy" were the subject of important provisions in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, implemented in November 1993. What we are seeing here is a critical transformation of Europe: henceforth, one of the Union's objectives is to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence (Common Provisions of Title I).

An evaluation of the initial progress of this Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) clearly emphasizes the limitations of the mechanisms set up almost exactly two years ago. There are those who cite Yugoslavia as evidence to support their belief that the CFSP is impotent. For my part, I say again that the Treaty on European Union represented an original response - even if a limited one - to what had become a very unstable situation. This Treaty, more valuable and more innovative than its reputation might suggest, has the signal merit of explicitly displaying the political purpose of European integration, even if, here and there, we need to review the working methods, bring greater efficiency and transparency to the institutional system, reinforce its democratic criteria and, in particular, emphasize more clearly this European identity in matters of security and defence, the need for which is becoming clearer now that the euphoria at the end of the Cold War is dying away.

The world is once again becoming a dangerous place: shaken by internal crises of identity, rights or power; confused and, as it were, disoriented by the collapse of the Cold War certainties; what confronts us, then, is a sort of return to our origins. The original modest Community of six, brought into being 40 years ago to prevent further wars between Europeans, has given us security, democratic stability and prosperity. Over the years, it has opened its doors to other countries which believed in the eminently political objective of bringing about an "ever closer union between the peoples of Europe". Today, the Union has a duty to extend that security to the other countries of Eastern Europe. Their integration will be the biggest issue of the next 10 or 20 years because the prospect of a Union of 20 or 25 or even more states, turns the entire political, economic and institutional machinery on its head.

Within the framework of Article XII of the 1948 Brussels Treaty (WEU), we will have the opportunity offered by the due date of 1998(1) to enter into solid powerful joint defence commitments and to make this an integral part of the European Union dynamics. More generally, and at a time when barely two years have passed since the Maastricht Treaty came into force, this treaty is already under review: even now, preparations are taking place for an Inter-Governmental Conference which, beginning in 1996, will carry out an evaluation and re-examination of the present provisions. Let us not miss this deadline.

To clarify the issues at stake, this article will begin by explaining why the Treaty has to be re-examined. Title V on the CFSP, a remarkable conceptual breakthrough, prepared the way for the emergence of a European pillar within the Alliance. It committed the WEU - defined as the defence component of the European Union - to a realignment which will be made even more TcompleteU by the necessary opening-up to our nearest neighbours. I shall attempt to show, however, that this conceptual breakthrough has not been followed up by decisive advances in practical terms, and that the necessary analysis of the implementation of the CFSP, the institutional mechanisms and the security devices, remains patchy.

In the second part of this article, I shall discuss the two key points of the 1996 re-examination: what should be done to ensure that the political mechanism is functional and that decisions are taken effectively; and how should the relationship between the Union and the WEU be structured? In connection with these two themes, the Commission will ensure that the Union does not stray from certain fundamental principles which give the political design its permanence and cohesion.

Why must the treaty be re-examined?

The CFSP: a conceptual and political breakthrough

By promoting these objectives, the Europeans are giving a clear signal that they have no intention of allowing themselves to be deprived of their patrimony of peace, prosperity and democracy, patiently built up during the forty years of the existence of the European Communities, backed up by a close alliance with the United States. On this latter point, incidently, the Treaty endeavours to bring to the strategic relationship with the United States a degree of seriousness and realism which would lead Europe to take the primary responsibility for its own security. In fact, it would no longer be reasonable to expect the American taxpayer to continue to act as guarantor for the defence of a Europe which - in terms of population, wealth and commercial and industrial strength - is very broadly comparable with the United States.

The encouragement given to the European Union at the NATO Summit of January 1994 to develop its own security and defence identity, and in time a common defence compatible with that of the Alliance, reflected this expected sharing of the responsibilities, costs - both human and financial - and risks, the inevitability of which is demonstrated by the two-thirds reduction in American military strength in Europe.

The Commission believes that the success of the European enterprise is still largely dependent on its links with the United States, based on shared values and common strategic interests. The Commission has always regarded the compromises reached at Maastricht, between the more TAtlanticistU positions and those which attached more importance to an autonomous European defence, as the basis for a balanced and dynamic accord. The CFSP has no further need to justify its concern for respecting the Atlantic commitments entered into in 1949; in the future, it will lend its authority to the permanence of those commitments. The WEU, as a stronger European pillar of the Alliance, and as a defence component of the European Union which is in the process of establishing its distinguishing characteristics and resources, can thus be seen - as the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference approaches - as the central issues of a dialectic whose nature has changed radically in the last three years.

The novel feature of the so-called "Petersberg tasks" agreed by the WEU and NATO, over and above the joint use of armed forces for collective defence, is that they supplement the integration which was formerly generated from the outside by the Soviet threat. Whether these commitments relate to humanitarian aims or to the maintenance or re-establishment of peace, they express the spirit of voluntarism. By assigning designated and integrated military forces to undertake these tasks - the European Corps is one example, and there are also the recent decisions announced in Lisbon last May on EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR(2), not to mention various NATO forces whose possible assignment to WEU missions has been formally agreed - the WEU has demonstrated that the process of European integration was not "separate" from the Allied strategic effort. These are early days; the military machinery is still not highly structured; past habits still exert a paralysing effect; but the movement has begun. From now on, it will have to adapt to the imperatives of opening up the Union to its European neighbours.

The European Union has established a structured relationship with nine Central and Eastern European countries, recognized their vocation to join the Union, and established an active pre-accession strategy. The WEU has offered these countries the status of Associate Partners.

To supplement these efforts at political integration, the Union has just concluded a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia. This is an important step towards integrating Russia into a continental security structure which is in the full flow of development. The Commission, for its part, has constantly worked to integrate the transfers of resources and know-how which it has been organizing since 1989 into an explicit political logic. For example, the European Union has brought its full weight to bear in order to persuade the Ukrainian Government to respect the undertakings of the Lisbon Protocol on the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia and to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear state. As regards the Baltic states, the official prospect of admission is not a neutral matter: it is not easy to be disinterested in the security of countries linked to us by economic and political symbiosis.

In the Mediterranean, Turkey and the Middle East, the European Union is demonstrating that the Community dimension requires this form of political extension, without which aid serves no purpose, support has no voice and adhesion to a peace process lacks conviction. Peace will continue to be a fragile thing between us unless it also services to encourage our neighbours to adopt comparable models.

The CFSP: a contrasting diagnosis

The European Political Cooperation (EPC) inaugurated in the early 1970s formed part of an informal, non-binding system. Its aim was to develop more extensive consultations and areas of cooperation. Organized on the consensual model, it led to satisfactory compromises and made it possible to identify a common programme of exchanges and mutual comprehension. The CFSP is a more structured and binding extension of the EPC. The changes in the political climate which are having a serious impact on defence matters - the former Yugoslavia, for example, but also all the other danger zones which are moving closer to us - have established a scenario in which expediting work on the CFSP has become, as it were, a duty to the peoples of Europe and to future generations.

However, the procedures selected two years ago set the CFSP apart from Community affairs from the outset, and established the Council at the centre of the decision-making process, while trying to preserve the principle of institutional unity enshrined in the Common Provisions of the Treaty. The formula has thus slowed the operation of the decision-taking mechanisms: the need for decisions to be taken unanimously, the complex overlap between mechanisms which may be activated by Community foreign relations (first pillar) or by the CFSP (second pillar) or both together, problems with liberating budgetary funds, etc. This running-in period would probably have been easier to tolerate without the difficult security climate referred to above.

The war in the former Yugoslavia has increased public perception of the inadequacies of the CFSP. Yet the drama in Bosnia began before this policy came into force, at a stage when the WEU had yet to benefit from any specific restructuring. The events on the ground, and the adoption of the Contact Group formula, have shown that the states most closely concerned have considered it more effective to take action outside the framework of the CFSP: in a sense, this is a trial for the European Union, but it is also, undoubtedly, a "maturity crisis". The CFSP is barely out of its infancy. If we are, nevertheless, able to find a way of resolving this conflict, let us not ask ourselves if we have respected our institutional mechanisms: let us rather ask ourselves how to make those mechanisms even more effective and able to supplement what will have been achieved by the Contact Group, the Alliance and the United Nations.

The Maastricht Treaty originally provided for three forms of intervention:

• Common positions (Article J.2), are intended to permit greater coordination of national policies, especially in international arenas. Their number has been limited, and they have often been no more than a reaction to crisis situations (sanctions, embargos, etc.). The common positions have raised the problem of confusion between Community matters and those within the province of the CFSP: for example a sanction, which is a manifestly political decision, really affects trade, finance, cooperation schemes and all activities covered by Community procedures;

• Joint actions (Article J.3), by contrast, represent a major step forward by comparison with EPC, allowing political, financial, economic and human resources to be released for the benefit of specific projects which commit the member states. Unfortunately, their field of application has been very narrow: there have been eight in total, but they have constituted the essence of the CFSP initiatives undertaken in less than two years. They represent a strange succession of ad hoc operations and more global undertakings: observing elections (Russia, South Africa); regulatory work (controls on exports of dual purpose goods); diplomatic involvement and possibly even subscribing to wide-ranging and sensitive security issues (Stability Pact, Non-Proliferation Treaty, convention on anti-personnel mines); and the mobilization of substantial resources (humanitarian aid in Bosnia, the administration of Mostar, and the Palestinian police force). The European Union seems to have adopted joint actions at random, amidst an increasing number of Declarations, which create confusion as to the exact role of the instruments and the links between actions and intentions;

• As the third form of intervention provided for by the CFSP, Article J.4.(1) provides that the Union "requests" the WEU, which it describes as an integral part of its development, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions which have implications in the field of defence.

No formal use has been made of this mechanism. The links established within the framework of the Mostar administration between the Council of the Union and the WEU are the most closely aligned with the provisions of the Treaty. By contrast, the decision by the Alliance in February 1994 to protect the Sarajevo exclusion zone by threatening air strikes immediately followed a meeting of the Council of Ministers of the European Union on 7 and 8 February and the Declaration, published on the evening of 7 February, calling for a "meeting of the Atlantic Council at the earliest possible stage". Article J.4, which instructed the Union to approach the WEU in cases of this kind (the Treaty does not say that the Union "may request", it says that the Union "requests" the WEU ...), was ignored. This structure does not yet have the resources for such an undertaking, but it would have been possible to respect more formally the political and legal commitments. It is instances such as this which reveal the continuing immaturity of the mechanisms set up at Maastricht. There are, however, various much more positive features to be seen in the balance sheet of the CFSP: the Stability Pact, the preparations for the Conference to review the Non Proliferation Treaty which took place last Spring in New York, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE):

• The European Stability Pact was an audacious undertaking by the Union in the area of preventive diplomacy and its effects will long continue to be felt at the heart of the most difficult problems which complicate the European security scenario: the questions of minorities and borders. The Pact, a notable exercise in external cohesion, provides food for thought not only because it forms a sharp contrast with everything that the Community and the Union have been able to do hitherto but because it could create a precedent that could be applied in other regions of the Continent and lay the groundwork for what the CFSP so sadly lacks: a shared diplomatic vision;

• The joint action on the NPT, more specific but of critical importance for the non-proliferation arrangements as a whole, committed the Union to genuine negotiations on international security and created an inflow which I hope will gather momentum until it eventually results in the planned negotiation of a full and final agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests and, here again, the choice of a joint action;

• Finally, there is the OSCE, and the ongoing work on a European security model. As an outline of the peaceful arrangements that Europe hopes to develop with Russia and America, the model proves that when, as in these negotiations, the Union has a firm political will, it is capable of evolving quite specialized theoretical guidelines, presenting them in an ordered manner and bringing its weight to bear effectively on the political issues. On the basis of specific proposals, the Commission has thus, via the Union, achieved a high political profile. In substance, we acted to promote a global approach in this area, "economic security" being enshrined as a major factor in the stability of the Continent.

How can the CFSP be made to work?

The possibility and the desirability.

First, there is the question of the decision-making process. The rules for voting at the Council are a good indicator of the level of maturity of the European enterprise. The majority principle, which is very widely accepted within the Community, is one of the most notable sources of a praxis which gives the Community its strength, making its influence felt in the outside world and exerting a power of attraction over those countries that want to join the Union, more because it obliges the states to negotiate in order to achieve a common objective than because it imposes the rule of the majority.

The CFSP, a younger institution than the Communities, does not enjoy the same level of maturity: although the adoption of "Joint Actions" theoretically allows voting by a weighted qualified majority - following several previous decisions taken unanimously - the principle of unanimous agreement is still the rule. This particularly applies to all initiatives which have implications in the sector of defence, where provision is made for a request to the WEU.

Because of its particular characteristics and the efficiency which the majority method has allowed to develop in Community matters, the Commission is inclined to favour increased use of it. In any case, abandoning the automatic principle of unanimity does not necessarily mean the general adoption of the qualified majority system: significant and essential compromise solutions are readily available.

Hence, in the most sensitive fields, of which defence is one, a differentiated structure could be applied in which, for example, the qualified majority method would be reserved for political decisions while initiatives with an impact on defence would be subjected to formulae better suited to the nature of the subject - unanimity when the vital interests of a member state may be called into question, or special qualified majority, benevolent abstention, ad hoc weighting of votes as a function of the degree of commitment of the member states or their close interests, and so on. It is in connection with the handling of the military component that we will see whether our member states are resolved to carry through the clearest transformation.

The second fundamental problem concerns relations between the European Union and its defence component, the WEU. With the recent expansion to include Austria, Finland and Sweden, there are now five countries which belong to the European Union but are not members of the WEU.(3) The fate of this organization, as a formal issue in the debate on European defence, will be the best reflection of the political will of the negotiators. Described by the Treaty as being an integral part of the development of the Union, the WEU - which defined itself as the defence component of the Union in the declaration of 10 December 1991 - is clearly destined to be integrated into the European Union.

On this subject, between now and 1996, the Treaty on European Union will be the subject of a dual interpretation. One version suggests that the Union, for an indeterminate period, will specifically have to make a request to the WEU every time the defence aspect crops up in a political initiative. According to the second interpretation, the question of the links between that organization and the European Union's institutions will have to be decided more or less in the short term, as otherwise we should find ourselves embarked upon a political, institutional and military exercise which was not only incomprehensible but, worse still, at odds with the capital invested in the Alliance.

The Commission's duty of intervention

• First, our publics want to identify with the projects we suggest to them, and claim the right to retain control over the factors that make up their everyday lives and local activities, and to manage their own local affairs. They are developing, at a pace which it is essential that we should integrate into our projects, an exponential sensitivity to problems of individual and collective identification, and even of culture and expression. Identifying with security and defence, and accepting its cost, also means taking into account this intellectual requirement;

• Next, we are facing the inevitable expansion of the Union. The pre-accession strategies have to go hand in hand with a strengthening of institutions, clarification of the ways in which our Union is governed and represented, and greater democratic control;

• And third, Europe and the world are once again becoming dangerous places. The Gulf War - and much more recently the Balkans - provide proof that even the largest states would like to see greater integration of crisis management, but that the alternative to the conventional power networks still lacks credibility.

How, then, are we to ensure the proper functioning and the security of a European Union of 25 or 28 states when the climate of international opinion has forgotten the euphoria created by the ending of the Cold War, and when people - more concerned than ever before with their human, natural, professional and health environments - have difficulty in identifying with global ambitions such as the aim of a united Europe?

As far as decision-making processes are concerned, there are at least three criteria which must be preserved if we intend to adopt and adapt the qualified majority rule: we must not allow a minority to block the normal functioning of the Union and the defence of its interests; we must not oblige states to engage in acts of force which they can not support; institutional unity must not be fragmented by mechanisms which exclude security and defence from the general responsibilities of the Council.

In order to improve the way in which the system operates, a central planning authority will have to be envisaged, with the involvement of the Council and the Commission and in conjunction with the WEU. Such an authority cannot fail to make it easier to analyse information, and ultimately to take decisions.

As far as defence is concerned, our target - according to the legal commitments entered into at Maastricht - is to be integrated with the CFSP and hence, ultimately, to achieve a WEU/European Union osmosis. Although it is not a very realistic project for the immediate future, this aim can be validated and provided with a procedure and a timetable. Several preliminary stages will be necessary: an in-depth study on adapting the rules of the CFSP to the specific case of defence; vigorous political negotiations with those states which have not hitherto wanted to join the WEU; and, finally, introducing into the necessary debate on the external representation of the Union, the question of the part played by the 'European pillar' in the Atlantic Alliance.

This 'European pillar' will have to be illustrated by specific practical actions, failing which the withdrawal of two-thirds of the American forces from the Continent and the announced expansion of the Atlantic Alliance will harm this organization upon which everyone is relying to continue to play the leading role which has been, and must remain, its own. We cannot continue to have the use of the world"s most formidable defence machine unless the Europeans, in their own interest, allocate resources to it which are equally appropriate and adapted to present-day crises.

I shall not go into detail about ways of increasing the operational capacities of the WEU. That organization is moving forward, and it has defined certain tasks; our commitment must take the credit for that.

But it is necessary to go further and ensure the political endorsement of the entire system. In this context, the illusion of 'peace dividends' is highly dangerous: nothing can be taken for granted. The Commission is doing everything possible in this area to ensure that the matter of an independent European armaments policy is handled with diligence, on the basis of the work already done by an informal group set up jointly by the WEU and the European Union.

Conclusion

The Union cannot be answerable for global security, but experience shows that where it could have played a forceful role it has been unable to commit itself unambiguously and mobilize its forces. I am convinced that unless we are prepared to equip the Union with foreign policy and joint defence resources on a scale capable of confronting the current issues, we shall have taken a serious risk and set up an idol with feet of clay which will rapidly become destabilized when other crises arise.

In Bosnia, despite extensive diplomatic efforts and notwithstanding the evolution of the peace plan, on which work is still continuing today, the Union has lacked the necessary resilience to impose a solution. What is being done by the Allies clearly deserves the Union's support. Let us be sufficiently clear-sighted to realize that that support will soon become indispensable when the time comes to talk about reconstruction and political stability based on the peace mechanisms we are preparing.

That is the way I see the overall picture. There are obvious consequences for my view of the role of the European Union, its working methods, and what we will need to talk about at the Inter-Governmental Conference in 1996.

The Commission over which I preside is fully aware of the difficulty of the undertaking, and the specific nature of defence matters. But the note on which I would like to end this article is one that combines the rejection of a wait-and-see policy with a very strong respect for what goes to make up the individual identity of each of the historic, diplomatic and military traditions of our states. Let us find a way to reconcile the two.

Footnotes

1. The treaty gives member nations the right to secede after 50 years.

2. France, Italy and Spain announced that they would organize a land force (EUROFOR) and a maritime force (EUROMARFOR).

3. The other two being Denmark and Ireland.