U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1996 APRIL: PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM, 1995
Office of the Secretary
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Philip C. Wilcox, Jr.
MIDDLE EAST OVERVIEW
The deadliest terrorist attack against US interests in the Middle East
since the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut took place on 13
November in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. A vehicle bomb badly damaged the
headquarters of the Office of the Program Manager/Saudi Arabian National
Guard (OPM/SANG), a military training mission. Seven persons, including
five US citizens, were killed and 42 were wounded. Several shadowy
groups, including the "Islamic Movement for Change," claimed
responsibility for the incident. Saudi Arabian authorities are
aggressively investigating the incident in close cooperation with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Fatalities from extremist violence in Egypt rose slightly above 1994
totals. Nevertheless, Egyptian authorities continued a successful
crackdown against extremists, arresting some important leaders and
confining violence to upper Egypt. In November, al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya
(the Islamic Group or IG) renewed efforts to target Egypt's tourist
industry. In two shooting attacks against trains traveling through Qina
and Al Minya Governorates in upper Egypt, two Europeans and 10 Egyptians
For the first time, Egyptian extremists extended their campaign of
violence outside Egypt's borders. The IG claimed responsibility for an
assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in
Ethiopia in June, and in November the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad,
Pakistan, was bombed, killing 16 and wounding 60. Both the IG and the
Jihad Group claimed responsibility for this attack.
In Algeria widespread terrorism continued the trend of recent years.
Armed insurgents turned increasingly to the use of indiscriminate
bombings in their offensive against the government, deemphasizing their
reliance on military-style attacks on Algerian security units. While
attacks against foreigners in Algeria decreased overall, Islamic
militants expanded their offensive to include targets overseas and US
targets in Algeria. In November, Islamic militants set fire to a US
Embassy warehouse; this was consistent with threats against foreign -
including US - interests in Algeria issued by the Armed Islamic Group
(GIA). The same group is suspected of responsibility for the murder in
Paris in July of a prominent activist from the Islamic Salvation Front -
another Algerian Islamist opposition group - as well as a bombing campaign
in Paris that killed eight persons and wounded scores.
Elsewhere in North Africa, incidents of terrorist violence were low.
Tunisian authorities maintained effective control of the internal
security situation and, in particular, closely followed the activities
of the Tunisian Islamic Front, which claimed responsibility for the
murders of four policemen and has warned all foreigners to leave
Tunisia. In Morocco, an Egyptian detonated a bomb in the consular
section of the Russian Embassy, evidently to protest Russian policy in
Chechnya. Islamic extremists continued efforts to smuggle weapons
through Morocco into Algeria to support extremists there.
In Israel and the occupied territories/Palestinian autonomous areas,
incidents of political violence and terrorism continued to plague the
Palestinian-Israeli peaceprocess. On 4 November, a Jewish Israeli
extremist assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at a propeace rally
in Tel Aviv. In subsequent statements the assassin said he acted to
protest Rabin's peace process policies.
The overall number of anti-Israeli attacks declined to 33 in 1995 from
79 in 1994 due to a change in the nature of attacks, that is, less
frequent but more lethal suicide bombings. Casualty figures thus
remained high, with 45 Israeli soldiers and civilians killed, two US
civilians killed, and nearly 280 persons wounded in 1995, compared to 55
persons killed and more than 150 wounded in the previous year. The
Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) and the Palestine Islamic Jihad
(PIJ) claimed responsibility for most of these attacks, including
several devastating suicide bombings. Chairman Yasir Arafat's
Palestinian Authority (PA) launched a campaign to crack down on Islamic
militants while at the same time initiating political dialogue with
HAMAS to bring it into the political process. HAMAS announced a
temporary suspension of military activities in August while engaging in
talks with the PA; there were no major HAMAS attacks against Israelis
through the end of 1995.
Lebanon witnessed small improvements in the internal security situation
during the year, including in Beirut. Despite government efforts to
extend its control, however, many parts of the country remained outside
the central government's authority. The terrorist organization Hizballah
has yet to be disarmed and still operates freely in several areas of the
country, particularly the south. Incidents of internal political
violence continued to trouble many parts of the country.
The security situation in Algeria did not improve substantially in 1995.
Accurate casualty figures are difficult to acquire, but as many as
50,000 Algerians - militants, security personnel, and civilians - have died
as a result of the nearly four-year-old insurgency. Islamic extremists
slowed their attacks against foreign nationals inside Algeria in 1995,
but suspicions centered on the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) for a
series of terrorist attacks in France in July, September, and October.
Last year extremists carried out their first attack against a US target
in Algeria since Islamic militants began targeting foreigners in 1993.
On 9 November, Islamic extremists set fire to a warehouse belonging to
the US Embassy. The militants threatened the life of the Algerian
security guard because he was working for the United States, and they
specifically demanded to know whether there were any US citizens
present. The GIA probably carried out the attacks. The group had
threatened to strike US and other foreign targets in Algeria, and the
modus operandi of the attack was consistent with past GIA operations
against foreign facilities.
The GIA was responsible for the deaths of 31 foreigners in Algeria in
1995, compared to at least 64 in 1994. Most of the foreigners killed
were "soft targets," such as teachers and nuns. From July to October a
terrorist bombing campaign in France began against civilian targets,
killing eight persons and wounding 160. Suspicion centered on the GIA as
a protest of French support for Algiers. Suspicion also focused on the
GIA for the death of FIS leader Abdelbaki Sahraoui in Paris in July; the
group earlier had published Sahraoui's name in a list of FIS members
marked for death due to their conciliatory posture toward negotiating
with the Algerian regime.
Algerian militants changed their tactics slightly in 1995, relying more
heavily on the use of homemade bombs - especially car bombs - and decreasing
their reliance on more traditional military-style attacks on Algerian
security units. The GIA claimed responsibility for the suicide car
bombing of a police headquarters in downtown Algiers in January that
killed more than 40 persons. Insurgents stepped up attacks on
infrastructure targets this year, disabling bridges and electric power
facilities throughout the country. In May, GIA commandos attacked
foreign workers along a newly constructed gas pipeline, killing five.
The GIA continued its attacks against civilian targets, killing women
for refusing to wear the hidjab, intellectuals, and others it perceived
as "cooperating" with the regime and "spreading Western influence." Over
25 journalists were killed in 1995, making Algeria the most dangerous
place in the world for practitioners of this profession.
Violence in Algeria slowed significantly in the weeks before the
presidential election on 16 November, primarily because of extraordinary
measures employed by the security services. As these security measures
were relaxed, however, Algeria's fragmented Islamic movement continued
to attack foreigners; two Latvian sailors were shot within two weeks
after the elections.
Fatalities from Islamic extremist violence rose slightly in 1995, with
the number of victims - including noncombatants and police - and extremists
killed increasing from 286 in 1994 to 375 in 1995. Violence primarily
was confined to provinces in upper Egypt; there were no attacks in Cairo
or urban areas further north.
Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group or IG) continued to be the most
active Islamic extremist organization in Egypt in 1995. All attacks
occurred in upper Egypt, with much of the violence shifting from Asyu't -
the previous center of conflict - to Al Minya Governorate, specifically
around Mallawi. Some attacks also occurred in Qina Governorate. Police
and security elements were the focus of many attacks. The IG also is
believed to have been the culprit in the deaths of at least 28 Coptic
Christians and at least 20 Muslims alleged to be police informants. In
November, the IG also resumed its efforts to damage Egypt's tourist
industry, claiming responsibility for two shooting attacks that month
against trains traveling through Qina and Al Minya Governorates to
tourist sites in upper Egypt. Two Europeans and 10 Egyptians were
wounded in the attacks. The IG claims of responsibility were accompanied
by warnings for all foreign tourists to leave the country.
Egypt has stepped up its counterterrorist campaign, preventing Islamic
extremists from carrying out attacks in Cairo and other urban areas to
the north. A police sweep in Al Minya in September resulted in the
arrest of a key leader of the IG's military wing, who had been sought
since the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981.
During 1995, Egyptian Islamic extremist groups took their campaign of
violence outside Egypt for the first time. The IG claimed responsibility
for an assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in
Ethiopia on 26 June. The IG also took responsibility for a car bombing
in Rijeka, Croatia, in October that injured 29 Croatian nationals and
killed the car's driver. The IG accused the Croatian Government of
having arrested a visiting Gama'at member who had been living in
Denmark. Both the IG and the Jihad Group claimed responsibility for the
bombing on 19 November of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan.
Sixteen persons were killed in the attack and another 60 were injured.
The previously unknown International Justice Group also took
responsibility for the bombing in Pakistan, as well as for the shooting
death of an Egyptian diplomat in Geneva on 13 November.
Yigal Amir, a Jewish extremist associated with the little-known
"Fighting Jewish Organization" (EYAL), assassinated Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin at a propeace rally in Tel Aviv on 4 November. Amir
claimed to have acted alone, but Israeli security forces charged several
other alleged conspirators. Israel also stepped up its investigations of
EYAL and other extremist groups that may have had a hand in the murder.
Kach and Kahane Chai - which Israel outlawed as terrorist groups after the
Hebron massacre in February 1994 - remained active in 1995, though they
maintained lower profiles.
The overall number of anti-Israeli attacks instigated by Palestinians
declined to 33 in 1995 from 79 in 1994 due to a change in the nature of
attacks, that is, to less frequent but more lethal suicide bombings.
Casualty figures remained high, with 45 Israeli soldiers and civilians
and two US citizens killed and nearly 280 persons wounded in 1995,
compared to 55 persons killed and more than 150 wounded the previous
year. The increased lethality of the attacks was due mainly to
Palestinian extremist groups' increased use of suicide bombings, which
killed 39 and wounded 252.
The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) conducted five major anti-
Israeli attacks in 1995 as part of its campaign to derail the peace
process. The group claimed responsibility for three devastating suicide
bombings, including the bombing on 21 August of a bus in Jerusalem's
Ramat Eshkol neighborhood that resulted in the death of a US citizen,
Joan Davenny, and three Israelis, and the wounding of more than 100
civilians. Following that operation, HAMAS temporarily suspended its
military activities and entered into talks with the Palestinian
Authority (PA), in which HAMAS discussed the possibility of ending anti-
Israeli attacks and participating in the Palestinian elections on 20
January 1996. There were no major HAMAS attacks against Israelis from
the August suicide bus bombing through the end of 1995.
Other Palestinian groups that reject the peace process also attacked
Israelis. The Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)-Shaqaqi Faction claimed
responsibility for five suicide bombings that killed a total of 29
persons and wounded 107. One bus bombing on 9 April killed a US citizen,
Alisa Flatow, and seven Israelis and wounded 41 other persons. Although
the group suffered a strong blow when its leader, Fathi Shaqaqi, was
assassinated in Malta on 26 October, it remained capable of striking at
Israeli targets. On 2 November, the PIJ carried out two suicide bomb
attacks against Israeli targets in Gaza to retaliate for Shaqaqi's
murder, which the group believes Israel sponsored. No Israelis were
killed in the attacks. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (DFLP) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) also claimed responsibility for several attacks against Israelis
that occurred outside Palestinian Authority (PA) held areas in the West
The PA increased its effort to rein in Palestinian violence against
Israelis in 1995. The PA security apparatus stepped up its campaign to
register and confiscate weapons, thwart terrorist plots, and convict
Palestinians responsible for anti-Israeli acts. The PA thwarted a PIJ
attack planned for 10 June. In August, the Palestinian Police Force
arrested a HAMAS terrorist who was preparing a bomb to be set off in
Israel. Arafat and other senior PA officials regularly condemned acts of
terrorism as they occurred, especially the Rabin assassination.
Israel's vigilant border security appeared to effectively prevent
infiltrations from Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. Israeli troops on 12
August, for instance, captured a heavily armed guerrilla attempting to
infiltrate into Israel from Jordan. Hizballah and Palestinian
rejectionist groups continued to launch occasional - nine times in 1995 -
Katyusha rocket salvos into northern Israel from southern Lebanon. The
most serious rocket attacks occurred in November, when militants in
Lebanon fired 30 to 40 Katyushas into northern Israel over a two-day
period, wounding six Israeli civilians.
Jordanian security and police closely monitor secular and Islamic
extremists inside the country, detaining individuals suspected of
involvement in violent acts aimed at destabilizing the government or its
relations with other states. Jordanian authorities detained dozens of
persons in terrorist-related cases in 1995, including six members of the
Islamic Renewal Movement planning to attack foreign interests and two
individuals suspected of shooting a French diplomat in February. In late
July, Jordan arrested a suspect in the World Trade Center bombing,
pursuant to a request from the United States, and rendered him to US law
enforcement authorities in early August.
Jordan's peace treaty with Israel - signed on 26 October 1994 - commits the
two parties to cooperate against terrorism. Amman maintains tight
security along its border with Israel and has stopped individuals
attempting to infiltrate into the West Bank.
Several Palestinian rejectionist groups maintain a closely watched
presence in Jordan, including the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ),
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and the Islamic Resistance
Movement (HAMAS). The government in April warned HAMAS spokesman Ibrahim
Ghawsha, a Jordanian citizen, not to issue statements supportive of
anti-Israeli violence, as this was in violation of Jordanian law. Under
that law, Jordan expelled two senior HAMAS leaders in May for making
inflammatory statements against Israel. The two did not hold Jordanian
There was incremental improvement in the Lebanese security environment
in 1995 as the Lebanese Government struggled to expand its authority
throughout the country. The situation in the Beirut metropolitan area is
somewhat improved but remains dangerous. Large sections of Lebanon,
however, remain effectively beyond the central government's control.
There is a risk to Westerners, in particular, in uncontrolled areas such
as in the south and the Al Biqa' (Bekaa Valley). An unknown number of
Lebanese civilians were killed, injured, or displaced in the fighting in
southern Lebanon this year.
While the government has limited the activities of many violent
individuals and groups in Lebanon, the terrorist organization Hizballah
has yet to be disarmed and continues to operate as a separate polity
within the country. For example, Hizballah has announced that it will
operate a separate judicial system based on Islamic jurisprudence within
areas under its direct control.
Hizballah's animosity toward the United States continues. In its public
rhetoric, the group routinely denounces the United States. In March,
Hizballah leader Fadlallah stated that Hizballah "continue(s) to oppose
US policy everywhere." Hizballah also continues to make public
statements condemning the Middle East peace process.
Militia personnel in February kidnapped two individuals and held them
for four days before releasing them. Thousands of people seized during
the Lebanese Civil War remain unaccounted for.
Ahmad al-Assad'ad, the son of former Lebanese Parliament speaker Kamel
al-Assad'ad, apparently escaped injury on 3 July when handgrenades were
thrown at him during a rally in Nabatiyah in southern Lebanon.
In August gunmen shot and killed Shaykh Nizar al-Halbi, the chairman of
the Sunni fundamentalist group "Islamic Charitable Projects
Association," as he left his home in a West Beirut neighborhood. A group
calling itself the "Usama Kassass Organization" claimed responsibility.
Two suspects subsequently were arrested.
A car bombing in Jibshit killed a local Hizballah security official in
November. No one has claimed responsibility for the attack.
In December, Lebanese security forces reportedly broke up a terrorist
ring operating in northern Lebanon. This ring was planning to begin a
violent campaign of assassinations and bombings that month.
There were developments in several terrorism trials. In May, the
Judicial Council trying Lebanese Forces Leader Samir Ja'ja on charges of
domestic terrorism - for the bombing in February 1994 of a Maronite Church
in Zuq Mikha'il that killed 11 and wounded 59 - issued an indefinite
continuance (Sine Die) that suspended the trial. A second defendant,
Lebanese Forces Deputy Commander Fu'ad Malik, was granted bail on 17 May
for medical reasons. Ja'ja remains imprisoned for the assassination of
Dany Chamoun, a political rival, in 1990.
In June, Lebanon's Permanent Military Court sentenced (in absentia) two
defendants to death for the Beirut car bombing in December 1994 that
killed Hizballah member Fu'ad Mughniyah and two others. Two other
defendants received prison sentences.
By the end of the year, following a number of postponements, a Lebanese
court was set to proceed with the trial of three members of the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) for the murders in 1976 of
US Ambassador to Lebanon Francis E. Meloy and US diplomat Robert 0.
Several Palestinian groups that use terrorism to express their
opposition to the Middle East peace process maintain an active presence
in Lebanon. These include the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), the
Abu Nidal organization (ANO), the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).
These organizations conduct terrorist training in southern Lebanon.
There were few terrorist-related incidents in Morocco in 1995. The first
terrorist attack against a foreign diplomat in Morocco since 1985
occurred on 28 February, however, when an Egyptian citizen detonated a
bomb strapped to his body at the consular department of the Russian
Embassy. Although Moroccan officials initially suspected that the bomber
had ties to Islamic militants, subsequent investigations led Moroccan
officials to believe that the man was acting alone, and that the attack
was carried out to demonstrate his solidarity with the Chechen people.
Islamic extremists in Morocco continued their efforts to smuggle weapons
into Algeria to support Islamic opposition elements there. In mid-
October, Moroccan authorities arrested 16 persons in the eastern
province of Oujda whom the Moroccans alleged were transporting weapons
to Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front. Four of those arrested were
Algerians, strengthening the government claims that the arms were
intended for Algerian insurgents.
On 13 November, a car bomb exploded outside the Riyadh headquarters of
the Office of the Program Manager/Saudi Arabian National Guard
(OPM/SANG). Seven persons died in the blast, five of whom were US
citizens, and 42 were injured. At least three groups claimed
responsibility for the attack, including the Islamic Movement for
Change, the Tigers of the Gulf, and the Combatant Partisans of God. The
Saudi Government is aggressively investigating this attack with the
assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Tunis maintained effective control of the security situation in 1995,
paying special attention to Islamic dissidents, but did not prosecute
any individuals for specific acts of terrorism. In May the extremist
Tunisian Islamic Front (FIT) issued a warning that all foreigners in
Tunisia should leave, but it did not follow up with any concrete threats
or attacks. The group also claimed responsibility for a number of
operations in Tunisia, including the murders of four policemen. Tunisian
authorities have not confirmed or denied the claims.
There are allegations that the FIT is working in conjunction with the
Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and that its members may be training
in GIA camps. Several Tunisians were taken into custody in 1995 for
alleged involvement with the GIA network in Europe. The FIT claimed
responsibility for an attack in February against a Tunisian border post
on the Tunisia-Algeria border in which seven border guards were killed,
but some officials blame the GIA - possibly in conjunction with the FIT -
for the attack. As of 31 December, there were no similar incidents.